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A Target to the Heart of the First Amendment: 
Government Endorsement of Responsible 
Disclosure as Unconstitutional 
By Kristin M. Bergman* 
Brian Krebs, a former reporter for the Washington Post who is now known for his blog 
Krebs on Security, remained relatively unknown for most of his career. But in December 
2013, Mr. Krebs found that hackers had exploited a data vulnerability in Target’s 
electronic-payment system, compromising millions of credit-card numbers that had been 
used to purchase goods from the second-largest discount retailer in the United States. In 
the following months, an investigation revealed that the breach affected nearly half of the 
110-million credit cards recently used at Target, resulting in one of the largest known 
digital credit-card heists in history. 
 
Even before Target’s data breach personally affected millions of consumers, concern 
over the security of personal data was endemic. A survey conducted in March 2013 
revealed that 82.1% of Americans were at least somewhat worried about a data breach 
involving banks, government entities, or other organizations, and roughly the same 
percentage were concerned about identity theft and credit-card fraud.  With over 78-
million data records containing personal information exposed to breaches in the first ten 
months of 2014 alone, it is unsurprising that a separate survey found that 77% of 
consumers agreed that expeditious notification of vulnerabilities involving stolen or lost 
data was important. Coupled with the potential widespread harm caused by data 
breaches, discrepancies in data-holders’ approaches to security vulnerabilities have 
prompted a call for a national response. 
 
Generally, two approaches exist for confronting data security issues: full disclosure and 
responsible disclosure. Proponents of the former argue that stifling communication about 
data breaches or vulnerabilities, no matter the source, is detrimental, conflicting with 
both public sentiment and constitutional rights. On the other end of the spectrum, 
supporters of a responsible disclosure policy suggest that allowing companies to rectify 
data security issues before public dissemination provides a better solution. In effect, 
responsible disclosure requires those who discover a data vulnerability to not only notify 
the affected organization, but also keep knowledge of the data security weakness 
confidential, regardless of its potential impact on consumers. 
 
* Post-Graduate Legal Fellow, Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press. J.D., William & Mary 
School of Law, 2014; B.A., Brown University, 2011. I would first like to extend my thanks to Andy Sellars 
and Jeff Hermes for introducing me to this issue at the (now former) Digital Media Law Project, and for 
fostering and supporting my interest in media law. Many thanks also to Rebecca Green for her valuable 
insight, encouragement, and enthusiasm throughout the writing process, and to the staff of the 
Northwestern Journal of Technology & Intellectual Property. 
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Although the predominant industry approach, this Article argues that the responsible 
disclosure approach should not be legislatively or judicially adopted. Not only does a 
responsible disclosure policy violate the First Amendment as a prior restraint, but it also 
constitutes poor public policy, ultimately causing a chilling effect that would reduce 
business accountability. In an effort to avoid both limiting the development of enhanced 
data security safeguards and restricting the public’s ability to engage in self-help, 
Congress and the judiciary should allow basic market forces to pave the way for 
innovation in this continually evolving field. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
¶1  Brian Krebs, a former reporter for the Washington Post now known for his blog 
Krebs on Security,1 remained relatively unknown for most of his career. But in December 
2013, Mr. Krebs decided to do something that would affect millions of global 
consumers.2 Mr. Krebs received information from two confidential sources in the 
banking industry noting a major increase in fraudulent credit-card purchases.3 
Investigating this spike in credit-card fraud, Mr. Krebs turned to underground online 
 
1 KREBS ON SECURITY, http://krebsonsecurity.com/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2014). 
2 See Nicole Perlroth, Reporting from the Web’s Underbelly, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2014), http://www. 
nytimes.com/2014/02/17/technology/reporting-from-the-webs-underbelly.html?hpw&rref=business&_r=0. 
3 See id. 
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forums, where he discovered a data security breach of unparalleled magnitude. With the 
help of his sources, Mr. Krebs found that hackers had exploited a data vulnerability in 
Target’s electronic-payment system, compromising millions of credit-card numbers that 
had been used to purchase goods from the second-largest discount retailer in the United 
States. He ultimately concluded that “the breach extend[ed] to nearly all Target locations 
nationwide, and involve[d] the theft of data stored on the magnetic stripe of cards used at 
the stores,” affecting millions of cardholders.4  
¶2  Mr. Krebs first notified Target of the breach on December 18, 2013. But after 
“multiple requests for comment,”5 Target refused to address his inquiries. Recognizing 
the importance of informing the public of this far-reaching security breach, Mr. Krebs 
decided to post information about the data breach on his blog.6 The following morning 
Target announced the breach, confirming the “unauthorized access to Target payment 
card data.”7 In the following months, the investigation revealed that the breach affected 
nearly half of the 110-million credit cards recently used at Target, resulting in one of the 
largest known digital credit-card heists in history.8 Reflecting on Mr. Krebs’ role, 
Barmak Meftah, CEO of threat-detection service Alien Vault, stated, 
[Mr. Krebs is] doing the security industry an enormous favor by 
disseminating real-time threat information. . . . We are only as strong as 
our information. Unless we are very specific and effective about 
exchanging threat data when one of us gets breached, we will always be a 
step behind the attackers.9  
Fortunately, Target was relatively quick to respond after notification of the breach, even 
if the discovery and initial public disclosure came from an individual outside the 
company. But this expeditious response is not the norm. For instance, in 2010, security 
researchers notified Skype—now, a division of Microsoft—of a data vulnerability that 
allowed users to be tracked through their IP addresses.10 Despite notification of this data 
security weakness, Skype refused to address the issue for nearly a year, prompting the 
researchers to publish their findings, which in turn alerted the public of this vulnerability 
for the first time.11  
 
4 Brian Krebs, Sources: Target Investigating Data Breach, KREBS ON SECURITY (Dec. 18, 2013, 2:33 
PM), http://krebsonsecurity.com/2013/12/sources-target-investigating-data-breach/. 
5 See id. 
6 Id. 
 7 A Message from CEO Gregg Steinhafel About Target’s Payment Card Issues, TARGET (Dec. 19, 
2013), https://corporate.target.com/discover/article/Important-Notice-Unauthorized-access-to-payment-ca. 
8 Hadley Malcolm, Target Breach Helps Usher in New World of Data Security, USA TODAY (Feb. 24, 
2014, 5:22 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2014/02/22/retail-hacks-security-
standards/5257919/; see also Brian Krebs, The Target Breach, by the Numbers, KREBS ON SECURITY (May 
6, 2014, 12:24 AM), http://krebsonsecurity.com/2014/05/the-target-breach-by-the-numbers/ (reporting that 
seventy-million consumer records were stolen). 
9 Perlroth, supra note 2. 
10 See Joel Schectman, Skype Knew of Security Flaw Since November 2010, Researchers Say, WALL ST. 
J. (May 1, 2012, 8:06 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2012/05/01/skype-knew-of-security-flaw-since-
november-2010-researchers-say/. 
11 See id. 
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¶3  Over the past decade, data security issues have increasingly roused public concern. 
In the past two years alone, roughly half of all consumers have been notified of security 
breaches involving the loss of personal information.12 Coupled with the potential 
widespread harm caused by data breaches, discrepancies in data-holders’ approaches to 
security vulnerabilities have prompted a call for a national response. In the U.S. Senate 
Judiciary Committee’s hearing on Privacy in the Digital Age: Preventing Data Breaches 
and Combating Cybercrime,13 Senator Mike Lee recognized, “I generally trust the market 
to create the right incentives for retailers to protect data of their customers. But 
consumers need notification of data breaches for that to work. . . . One possible 
legislative response is to codify a national standard for data security.”14 In light of this 
hearing and the Target data breach, former Attorney General Eric Holder urged Congress 
to enact cybersecurity legislation encouraging heightened data security, including a 
“strong national standard” with a company-notification requirement when data has been 
compromised.15 Though Mr. Holder’s recommendations focused on disclosure 
requirements for data-hosting companies, Congress could promulgate similar standards 
for those who discover weaknesses or breaches in data security, thus reinforcing the 
efficacy of any data security legislation.16  
¶4  Generally, two approaches exist for confronting data security issues: full disclosure 
and responsible disclosure. Proponents of the former argue that stifling communication 
about data breaches or vulnerabilities, no matter the source, is detrimental, conflicting 
with both public sentiment and constitutional rights. They acknowledge but accept the 
 
12 EMC CORP., CONSUMER PERCEPTIONS ON SECURITY: DO THEY STILL CARE? (2014), available at 
http://www.emc.com/collateral/brochure/consumer-perceptions-on-security.pdf. 
13 Letter from Am. Bankers Ass’n et al. to Sen. Patrick Leahy, Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary, and 
Sen. Charles Grassley, Comm. on the Judiciary (Feb. 3, 2014), available at http://www.judiciary.senate. 
gov/hearings/hearing.cfm?id=138603a26950ad873303535a6300170f. 
14 Summary: Target Testifies on Massive Data Breach, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 4, 2014, 10:38 AM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/corporate-intelligence/2014/02/04/live-target-testifies-on-massive-data-breach/. 
15 Schuyler Velasco, Eric Holder Urges New Laws for Data Breaches After Target Attack, CHRISTIAN 
SCI. MONITOR (Feb. 24, 2014), http://www.csmonitor.com/Business/2014/0224/Eric-Holder-urges-new-
laws-for-data-breaches-after-Target-attack-video. Over the last decade, most states have passed notification 
laws requiring certain data-holders to inform consumers of security breaches in writing; however, these 
laws are traditionally limited in applicability to situations in which personally identifiable information was 
actually exposed. See State Security Breach Notification Laws, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/telecom/security-breach-notification-laws.aspx (last 
updated Aug. 20, 2012). 
16 Disclosure of data has been central in discussions of proposed cybersecurity bills. See, e.g., Data 
Security Act of 2014, S. 1927, 113th Cong. (2014); Data Security and Breach Notification Act of 2014, S. 
1976, 113th Cong. (2014); Personal Data Protection and Breach Accountability Act of 2014, S. 1995, 113th 
Cong. (2014); Data Security and Breach Notification Act of 2013, S. 1193, 113th Cong. (2013) (permitting 
delayed disclosure “to avoid interfering with a civil or criminal investigation or threatening national or 
homeland security”). However, no consensus has been found between parties to allow passage. See Alina 
Selyukh, Will Congress Require Companies to Share Data on Cyber-Security Breaches?, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR (Apr. 30, 2014), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Latest-News-Wires/2014/0430/Will-Congress-
require-companies-to-share-data-on-cyber-security-breaches. With President Obama’s renewed emphasis 
on cybersecurity, perhaps a relevant law will finally be enacted in 2015. President Barack Obama, State of 
the Union Address (Jan. 20, 2015), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2015/01/20/remarks-president-state-union-address-january-20-2015 (“And tonight, I urge this 
Congress to finally pass the legislation we need to better meet the evolving threat of cyber attacks, combat 
identity theft, and protect our children’s information.”); see also Safeguarding American Consumers & 
Families, WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 12, 2015), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/12/fact-
sheet-safeguarding-american-consumers-families.  
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risk of exploitation. On the other end of the spectrum, supporters of a responsible 
disclosure policy suggest that allowing companies to rectify data security issues before 
public dissemination provides a more effective solution. Responsible disclosure requires 
those who discover a data vulnerability to not only notify the affected organization, but 
also keep knowledge of the data security weakness confidential, regardless of its potential 
impact on consumers. 
¶5  Although the predominant industry approach, this Article argues that the 
responsible disclosure approach should not be legislatively or judicially adopted.17 Not 
only does a responsible disclosure policy violate the First Amendment as a prior restraint, 
but it also constitutes poor public policy, ultimately causing a chilling effect that would 
reduce business accountability. Further, while Target’s remedial measures worked, it is 
easy to imagine what might have transpired if Mr. Krebs had not published his discovery 
after confirming Target’s data breach. No record exists of how many consumers were 
able to take action in the hours following Mr. Krebs’s revelation to prevent credit-card 
fraud, making it impossible to gauge how much damage would have occurred if Mr. 
Krebs had not forced Target’s hand to disclose the breach. Worse yet, as the law 
currently stands, those who expose data vulnerability issues are often subject to both civil 
and criminal liability, such as under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.   
¶6  In sum, it would be inappropriate for the government—whether by an act of 
Congress or a judicial order—to adopt a responsible disclosure policy, delaying or 
otherwise hindering the publication of news about data security vulnerabilities and 
breaches. Part II begins the analysis with additional background on disclosure policies 
and prior opportunities for government endorsement of a policy. Part III then applies the 
First Amendment’s prior restraint doctrine to limitations on vulnerability speech. Part IV 
turns to editorial protections specific to the press, while Part V considers the policy 
arguments against adopting responsible disclosure. Part VI concludes with consideration 
of other relevant legal concerns, such as contract and agency law. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Vulnerability Disclosure Policies 
¶7  For the past fifteen years, an avid policy debate has ruminated within the 
technology community over the best way to approach the discussion and publication of 
data security issues.18 Many recognize the myriad advantages of publishing news about 
security weaknesses and breaches, including better data-holder accountability, increased 
knowledge among consumers, opportunity for peer review, faster resolution of data 
vulnerabilities, and the development of improved security measures.19 On the other hand, 
a policy mandating confidentiality of data breaches has its benefits. For instance, 
immediate public disclosure interferes with a company’s ability to resolve vulnerabilities 
 
17 See Scott Berinato, Software Vulnerability Disclosure: The Chilling Effect, CSO (Jan. 1, 2007, 7:00 
AM), http://www.csoonline.com/article/2121727/application-security/software-vulnerability-disclosure--
the-chilling-effect.html. 
18 See Vulnerability Disclosure Publications and Discussion Tracking, UNIV. OF OULU, https://www.ee. 
oulu.fi/research/ouspg/Disclosure_tracking (last visited Aug. 14, 2014) (tracking the debate between 
models of vulnerability disclosure from 1997 to present day).  
19 See infra Part V(A)–(B). 
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discreetly without causing reputational or financial harm. Further, public disclosure might 
encourage criminals to exploit newly exposed security vulnerabilities before the data-
holder is able to create a patch. Bruce Schneier, a data security expert, summarizes this 
debate, asking: 
Is the benefit of publicizing an attack worth the increased threat of the 
enemy learning about it? Should we reduce the Window of Exposure by 
trying to limit knowledge of the vulnerability, or by publishing the 
vulnerability to force vendors to fix it as quickly as possible?20 
¶8  Discussed previously, two disclosure policies have developed within this debate—
full disclosure and responsible disclosure. Perhaps, however, it is best to understand these 
policies as ends of a spectrum rather than discrete alternatives. Full disclosure is the 
“practice of making the details of security vulnerabilities public.”21 In contrast, many 
refer to a delayed public-disclosure policy as “responsible disclosure” or “coordinated 
vulnerability disclosure.”22 Though company policies vary, most require the security 
researcher who discovers a vulnerability to notify the company of the vulnerability first, 
and then delay (or resist) public disclosure, giving the company an opportunity to remedy 
the problem before publication.23  
¶9  Over the past few decades, disclosure policies have evolved alongside technology. 
Although nondisclosure was originally the norm, full disclosure gained prominence in the 
1980s, remaining the dominant stance for over a decade.24 As the twenty-first century 
progresses, however, more vendors and researchers are embracing the responsible 
disclosure movement.25 
 
20 Bruce Schneier, Full Disclosure of Security Vulnerabilities a “Damned Good Idea,” CSO (Jan. 9, 
2007), http://www.csoonline.com/article/216205/schneier-full-disclosure-of-security-vulnerabilities-a-
damned-good-idea. Schneier describes the Window of Exposure to “explain the evolution of a security 
vulnerability over time” in terms of “a graph of danger versus time, [with] the Window of Exposure as the 
area under the graph.” Id. 
21 Id.; see also Brian Deline, Full Disclosure, SANS INST. (Nov. 28, 2000), http://web.archive.org/web/ 
20010210204159/http://www.sans.org/infosecFAQ/hackers/disclosure.html.  
22 See, e.g., Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure, MICROSOFT SECURITY RESPONSE CTR., 
http://www.microsoft.com/security/msrc/report/disclosure.aspx (last visited Aug. 21, 2014); ORG. FOR 
INTERNET SAFETY, GUIDELINES FOR SECURITY VULNERABILITY REPORTING & RESPONSE 6 (2004), 
available at http://www.oisafety.org/reference/process.pdf. 
 23 See Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Hacking Speech: Informational Speech and the First Amendment, 107 
NW. U. L. REV. 795, 845 n.154 (2013); Bruce Schneier, Crypto-Gram, SCHNEIER ON SECURITY (Nov. 15, 
2001), https://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0111.html#1. Microsoft and Scott Culp led the way in 
adopting such a delayed-publication policy. Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure, supra note 22; ORG. 
FOR INTERNET SAFETY, supra note 22. More recently, Google adopted a policy to address security 
researchers’ discoveries of new data vulnerabilities with a more aggressive timeline for companies to 
resolve the security vulnerability or notify their users. See Chris Evans & Drew Hintz, Disclosure Timeline 
for Vulnerabilities Under Active Attack, GOOGLE ONLINE SECURITY BLOG (May 29, 2013), 
http://googleonlinesecurity.blogspot.ro/2013/05/disclosure-timeline-for-vulnerabilities.html. 
24 Schneier, supra note 20.  
25 See Q&A with Bruce Schneier, BERKMAN CTR. (Nov. 25, 2013), available at 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/node/8665.  
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B. Disclosure and the Courts 
¶10  Dr. Andrea M. Matwyshyn recently coined the term “vulnerability speech,” or 
“informational speech that identifies a potentially critical flaw in a technological system 
or product but also indirectly potentially facilitates criminality.”26 Invoking this language, 
the debate over vulnerability disclosure policies should be understood as a debate over 
the proper scope of vulnerability speech and its potential regulation. Yet, despite the 
growing popularity and importance of this debate, few courts have had the opportunity to 
address the matter, and no court has issued a definitive answer. 
1. MBTA v. Anderson 
¶11  In 2008, three students at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) 
discovered a vulnerability in the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority’s (MBTA) 
transit-payment system.27 In doing so, the students reverse engineered the magnetic stripe 
on passenger tickets to hack the MBTA-provided smartcard, allowing them to access 
vital, nonpublic information.28 Planning to present at DEFCON, a conference for 
hackers,29 the MIT students wished to expose the weaknesses in the MBTA’s system by 
demonstrating the process they used and releasing the open-source tools they wrote while 
researching the MBTA system.30  
¶12  Before the presentation, the MBTA filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Massachusetts to enjoin the students from presenting at DEFCON or otherwise 
publically exposing the fare-payment system’s vulnerability.31 The MBTA’s complaint 
 
 26 Matwyshyn, Hacking Speech, supra note 23, at 798 (invoking and adopting Martin Redish’s language 
of “informational speech”). Though a compelling issue, this Article will not address the role of code in 
vulnerability speech and the potential implications it may have on First Amendment protection and 
analysis.  
27 Kim Zetter, DefCon: Boston Subway Officials Sue to Stop Talk on Fare Card Hacks—Update: 
Restraining Order Issued; Talk Cancelled, WIRED (Aug. 08, 2008, 11:45 PM), 
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2008/08/injunction-requ/. 
28 See id. 
 29 Speakers for DEFCON16, DEFCON, https://www.defcon.org/html/defcon-16/dc-16-
speakers.html#Anderson (last visited Mar. 22, 2014). The students planned to present on “The Anatomy of 
a Subway Hack: Breaking Crypto RFIDs & Magstripes of Ticketing Systems.” See id. 
 30 See id. The MIT students explained: 
 
In this talk we go over weaknesses in common subway fare collection systems. We focus 
on the Boston T subway, and show how we reverse engineered the data on magstripe 
card, we present several attacks to completely break the CharlieCard, a MIFARE Classic 
smartcard used in many subways around the world, and we discuss physical security 
problems. We will discuss practical brute force attacks using FPGAs and how to use 
software-radio to read RFID cards. We survey “human factors” that lead to weaknesses in 
the system, and we present a novel new method of hacking WiFi: WARCARTING. We 
will release several open source tools we wrote in the process of researching these 
attacks. With live demos, we will demonstrate how we broke these systems. 
 
Id. 
31 Complaint at 16, Mass. Bay Transp. Auth. v. Anderson, No. 08-CA-11364-GAO (D. Mass. 2008), 
2008 WL 6954941, available at https://www.eff.org/node/55690. The Electronic Frontier Foundation, 
which represented the students, has all of the relevant court documents for this case available for viewing 
and download on its site. ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/cases/mbta-v-anderson (last visited 
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alleged a violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), arguing that the 
students accessed the MBTA’s systems without authorization and that disclosure before 
allowing the MBTA to resolve the vulnerability internally would cause irreparable harm 
to the city’s transit system.32 Though the students insisted they did not intend to reveal 
sufficient details for someone to attack the MBTA system,33 the district court granted a 
ten-day temporary restraining order,34 preventing the students from presenting at 
DEFCON.35 The MBTA also filed a motion for a preliminary injunction—essentially to 
continue the temporary restraining order—but the court refused and vacated the 
restraining order.36 In an oral decision, Judge O’Toole declined, as a matter of statutory 
construction, to extend CFAA liability to this vulnerability speech.37 Unfortunately for 
the students, the decision came too late: the MBTA had effectively silenced them.  
¶13  Although Judge O’Toole avoided addressing First Amendment concerns, he 
nevertheless detailed the various policy rationales inherent to the vulnerability disclosure 
debate. The judge recognized: 
[T]here’s obviously interest in protecting the integrity of the fare system, 
in avoiding major loss to the MBTA. That’s certainly legitimate harm to 
be concerned about. There’s an interest and a potential harm to persons in 
the position of the defendants regarding their ability to engage in public 
discussions about these matters. And I make that point in the first instance 
without reference to the First Amendment, what it may or may not 
guarantee under these circumstances; that is, I think the harm exists as a 
practical matter without consideration of whether it’s something that also 
implicates the person. In other words, I think this matter can be resolved 
without resort to constitutional principles at this stage.38 
Though the court did not invoke the First Amendment, it ultimately protected the 
students’ interests in vulnerability speech and the public’s “right to know.”39  
 
Mar. 22, 2014). 
32 Complaint at 12, Mass. Bay Transp. Auth. v. Anderson, No. 08-CA-11364-GAO. 
33 Kim Zetter, Federal Judge in DefCon Case Equates Speech with Hacking: Updated with Recording 
from Hearing, WIRED (Aug. 10, 2008, 3:55 AM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2008/08/eff-to-appeal-
r/. 
34 Temporary Restraining Order at 2, Mass. Bay Transp. Auth. v. Anderson, No. 08-CA-11364-GAO 
(“That the MIT Undergrads are hereby enjoined and restrained, in accordance with Fed. R. Civ P. 65(b)(2), 
from providing program, information, software code, or command that would assist another in any material 
way to circumvent or otherwise attack the security of the Fare Media System.”). 
35 Ironically, the MBTA’s vulnerability report presented to obtain the temporary restraining order—and 
therefore made public when the order was granted—provided more information about the MBTA system’s 
security susceptibilities than the MIT students’ presentation would have disclosed. See Zetter, supra note 
33. 
36 See Transcript of Aug. 19, 2008 Motion Hearing at 5, Mass. Bay Transp. Auth. v. Anderson, No. 08-
CA-11364-GAO; see also Zetter, supra note 33. 
37 See Transcript of Aug. 19, 2008 Motion Hearing at 34, Mass. Bay Transp. Auth. v. Anderson, No. 08-
CA-11364-GAO. 
38 Id. at 63. 
39 See id.; see also Thomas I. Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U. L. Q. 1 
(1976) (describing the evolution of a right to know, or right to receive information, under the First 
Amendment). 
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¶14  Although a limited decision, the fact that Judge O’Toole recognized the value of 
vulnerability speech could deter courts from issuing similar injunctions in the future. 
Nevertheless, the district court’s initial injunction demonstrates the possibility of a court 
deciding to adopt a delayed-disclosure approach without properly accounting for the far-
reaching and unpredictable consequences of such a decision. Discussed next, a similar 
opportunity recently came before the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. 
2. United States v. Auernheimer 
¶15  Two years after the MBTA incident, Andrew Auernheimer and Daniel Spitler—
both members of Goatse Security, a consulting firm of semiautonomous security 
researchers—revealed a data vulnerability in AT&T’s computer system that exposed iPad 
owners’ personal information just two months after the product was released. 40 They 
discovered that an HTTP request on AT&T’s website could match the iPad owner’s 
Integrated Circuit Card Identifier (ICC-ID)41 with the iPad owner’s email address.42 After 
manually entering a few individual ICC-IDs, Auernheimer and Spitler wrote a script that 
systematically generated possible ICC-IDs, allowing them to harvest over 110,000 
subscribers’ email addresses.43  
¶16  Immediately upon discovering the vulnerability, Auernheimer approached several 
major news outlets, including the News Corporation, the San Francisco Chronicle, the 
Washington Post, and Thomson-Reuters, before Gawker agreed to publish news of the 
vulnerability.44 By the following day, however, AT&T had corrected the vulnerability, 
and the FBI had launched an investigation into the breach.45 In response to criticism over 
the disclosure, Goatse Security released a statement: 
This disclosure needed to be made. iPad 3G users had the right to know 
that their email addresses were potentially public knowledge so they could 
take steps to mitigate the issue (like changing their email address). This 
was done in service of the American public. . . . All data was gathered 
from a public webserver with no password, accessible by anyone on the 
 
 40 See Ryan Tate, Apple’s Worst Security Breach: 114,000 iPad Owners Exposed, GAWKER (June 9, 
2010, 4:50 PM), http://gawker.com/5559346/apples-worst-security-breach-114000-ipad-owners-exposed. 
Andrew Auernheimer is also known as “Weev.” Id. 
41 See id. Essentially, an ICC-ID is a device identification number stored on the SIM card to identify the 
unique account. This automatically integrates with the website’s URL upon accessing the tablet.  
42 See id. 
43 See id.; Matt Buchanan, The Little Feature That Led to AT&T’s iPad Security Breach, GIZMODO 
(June 9, 2010, 9:19 PM), http://gizmodo.com/5559686/the-little-feature-that-led-to-atts-ipad-security-
breach.  
44 See Superseding Indictment at 12, United States v. Auernheimer, No. 11-CR-470 SDW (D.N.J. Aug. 
16, 2012), 2012 WL 6676870; see also Tate, supra note 40. It is worth noting that in a later interview, 
Auernheimer mentioned that they only gave Gawker the data “because he agreed he would censor the ICC-
IDs and the emails so they couldn’t be used to compromise anything.” Elinor Mills, Hacker Defends Going 
Public with AT&T's iPad Data Breach (Q&A), CNET (June 10, 2010, 4:12 PM), http://www.cnet.com/ 
news/hacker-defends-going-public-with-at-ts-ipad-data-breach-q-a/. 
45 See Tate, supra note 40. 
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Internet. There was no breach, intrusion, or penetration, by any means of 
the word.46 
¶17  Although Goatse Security asserted that its security researchers had acted in the 
public interest, AT&T and the FBI felt otherwise. In early 2011, an FBI investigation led 
to a criminal complaint filed against Spitler and Auernheimer, alleging they committed 
fraud and violated the CFAA.47 Moreover, the misdemeanor CFAA charge was elevated 
to a felony because New Jersey state law considers accessing a computer without 
authorization and disclosing any data obtained from such unauthorized access a criminal 
offense.48 While Spitler pled guilty, Auernheimer chose to fight the indictment, seeking 
absolution from accusations he felt were unjust.49 Ultimately, a jury found Auernheimer 
guilty on all counts, resulting in a forty-one-month prison sentence and a fine of 
$73,167.50 He appealed his case to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals,51 wherein various 
parties chose to file amicus briefs concerning the potentially widespread consequences of 
the court’s ruling.52 
¶18  While the Third Circuit’s decision eventually pivoted on procedural issues, the 
district court’s ruling prompted various advocates of First Amendment protection to 
interject. For instance, many criticized the district court’s rejection of Auernheimer’s 
invocation of First Amendment protection: the court decided that the information 
conveyed, being both private and integral to the criminal conduct, was not protected by 
the First Amendment.53 In an amicus brief, the Berkman Center’s Digital Media Law 
Project (DMLP)54 argued that elevating the CFAA count from a misdemeanor to a felony 
for disclosing true information of public concern required the court to satisfy First 
Amendment scrutiny.55 Perhaps most important, the DMLP encouraged the appellate 
court to exercise restraint in endorsing a particular stance in the vulnerability disclosure 
debate: 
Preventing punishment in this case absent satisfaction of First Amendment 
scrutiny also ensures that the government does not have too great a hand 
in interfering with the ethics and norms of the data security community, 
who are currently engaged in a robust debate over when it is appropriate to 
tell a company first about bad data practices, and when it is better to 
inform the public directly . . . . Prosecutors and lawmakers should not use 
 
46 Ryan Tate, FBI Investigating iPad Breach (Update), GAWKER (June 10, 2010, 7:15 PM), 
http://gawker.com/5560542/fbi-investigating-ipad-breach. 
47 See Complaint at 2, United States v. Auernheimer, No. 11-CR-470 SDW. 
48 See id. 
49 See Superseding Indictment, supra note 44, at 1–15. 
50 See Verdict, United States v. Auernheimer, No. 11-CR-470 SDW (D.N.J. Nov. 20, 2012), 2012 WL 
6676886. 
51 See United States v. Auernheimer, 748 F.3d 525 (3d Cir. 2013).  
52 U.S. v. Auernheimer, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/cases/us-v-auernheimer (last 
visited Aug. 23, 2014); USA v. Andrew Auernheimer Docket Report, JUSTIA, http://dockets.justia. 
com/docket/circuit-courts/ca3/13-1816 (last visited Aug. 23, 2014). 
53 See Superseding Indictment, supra note 44. 
54 Brief of Amicus Curiae Digital Media Law Project in Support of Defendant–Appellant at 26, United 
States v. Auernheimer, No. 13-1816 (3d Cir. 2013), 2013 WL 3488592. 
55 See id. at 32. 
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heavy-handed and chilling applications of law to set the ethical norms 
around this delicate and complicated space.56 
¶19  The Government’s reply, in contrast, attempted to draw a line for appropriate data-
vulnerability disclosure;57 specifically, that the content divulged, rather than the act itself, 
dictated the legality of Auernheimer’s disclosure.58 Though its brief conceded that 
Auernheimer could have legally reported AT&T’s vulnerability, the Government 
asserted, “What he could not do, and what is not subject to First Amendment protection, 
is disclose the personal identifying information that he and Spitler obtained as a result of 
their breach of AT&T’s security.”59 In short, the Government argued that Auernheimer 
and Spitler acted illegally due to the disclosure of personal information, which is not 
protected speech. 
¶20  But the Third Circuit Court of Appeals chose to focus on venue, foregoing the 
opportunity to address vulnerability-speech protection.60 The court found that no essential 
conduct element of the crime occurred in New Jersey, despite Auernheimer having 
exposed information from New Jersey residents. “As we progress technologically, we 
must remain mindful that cybercrimes do not happen in some metaphysical location that 
justifies disregarding constitutional limits on venue,” wrote Judge Chagares.61 Pointing to 
the fact that Auernheimer and Spitler resided in Arkansas and California, respectively, 
and that AT&T’s servers were based in Georgia and Texas, the court found the 
connection to New Jersey insufficient to support venue.62  
¶21  Auernheimer’s release, however, did not preclude authorities in an appropriate 
venue from pursuing prosecution. The risk of a court reviewing disclosure policies and 
endorsing a single model, as was possible in this case, illustrates the possibility of judicial 
intervention in determining vulnerability-speech policy. Although balancing First 
Amendment interests is within the purview of the judiciary, this still-evolving and highly-
technical landscape requires authoritative restraint for healthy debate amongst the data 
security community and the public alike to work effectively, guiding the contours, at least 
initially, of vulnerability-speech protection. 
C. The First Amendment and the Prior Restraint Doctrine 
¶22  Any preemptive restriction on protected speech, which a responsible disclosure 
policy engenders, implicates the “doctrine of prior restraint.” A prior restraint is an 
official restriction delaying or prohibiting speech in advance of actual publication. “In 
constitutional terms, the doctrine of prior restraint holds that the First Amendment forbids 
the Federal Government to impose any system of prior restraint, with certain limited 
 
56 Id. at 31 (internal citations omitted).  
57 Brief for Appellee, United States v. Auernheimer, 748 F.3d 525 (3d Cir. 2013) (No. 13-1816). 
58 See id. at 121. 
59 Id.  
60 See Oral Argument, United States v. Auernheimer, 748 F.3d 525 (3d Cir. 2013) (No. 13-1816), 
available at http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/oralargument/audio/13-1816USAv.Auernheimer.wma; 
Auernheimer, 748 F.3d 525; see also Brian Merchant, Weev Is in Jail Because the Government Doesn’t 
Know What Hacking Is, MOTHERBOARD (Mar. 19, 2014, 3:25 PM), 
http://motherboard.vice.com/read/weev-is-in-jail-because-the-government-doesnt-know-what-hacking-is.   
61 Auernheimer, 748 F.3d at 541. 
62 See id. 
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exceptions, in any area of expression that is within the boundaries of that Amendment,” 
wrote Professor Thomas Emerson, summarizing the prior restraint doctrine.63 Stated 
differently, blanket preventative measures aimed to restrict protected speech before 
publication conflict with First Amendment rights, unless a judicial exception applies.  
¶23  The convention of disfavoring prior restraints has been a primary tenet of Anglo-
American law for most of modern history. In response to licensing schemes designed to 
control printing,64 Sir William Blackstone perhaps best articulated the early distaste for 
prior restraints: 
The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state; but 
this consists in laying no previous restraints upon publications, and not in 
freedom from censure for criminal matter when published. Every freeman 
has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public; 
to forbid this, is to destroy the freedom of the press; but if he publishes 
what is improper, mischievous or illegal, he must take the consequence of 
his own temerity.65 
The Framers of the U.S. Constitution evinced a sentiment similar to Blackstone’s 
antipathy for prior restraints.66 In fact, the founding fathers extended the reach of this 
doctrine beyond its English counterpart. Opining on the Sedition Act and freedom of the 
press, James Madison wrote, “This security of the freedom of the press requires that it 
should be exempt not only from previous restraint by the Executive, as in Great Britain, 
but from legislative restraint also.”67 Madison recognized that in order to protect freedom 
of the press effectively, the First Amendment must apply equally to all branches of the 
government. 
¶24  In the twentieth century, the U.S. Supreme Court revitalized the prior restraint 
doctrine, expanding the scope of First Amendment protection. The Court recognized that 
the First Amendment’s primary purpose is “to prevent all such previous restraints upon 
publications as had been practiced by other governments,”68 forming the basis for the 
doctrine’s revival in the influential prior restraint case Near v. Minnesota.69 In that case, a 
Minnesota court had enjoined a weekly newspaper from issuing “any publication 
 
63 Thomas I. Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 648, 648 (1955). 
These limitations are applied to the states via Fourteenth Amendment incorporation. For a more detailed 
and nuanced discussion of the doctrine of prior restraint, see Stephen R. Barnett, The Puzzle of Prior 
Restraint, 29 STAN. L. REV. 539 (1977); Vincent Blasi, Toward a Theory of Prior Restraint: The Central 
Linkage, 66 MINN. L. REV. 171 (1981); John C. Jeffries, Rethinking Prior Restraint, 92 YALE L.J. 409 
(1983); Martin H. Redish, The Proper Role of the Prior Restraint Doctrine in First Amendment Theory, 70 
VA. L. REV. 53 (1984); Jeffery A. Smith, Prior Restraint: Original Intentions and Modern Interpretations, 
28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439 (1987). 
64 See Emerson, supra note 63, at 650–52. 
65 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *151–52. 
66 U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
67 James Madison, Report on the Virginia Resolutions in 6 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 385, 387 
(Gaillard Hunt ed. 1900), available at http://press-
pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/amendI_speechs24.html. He went on to describe the understanding 
at the Constitutional Convention as being “that the liberty of conscience and the freedom of the press were 
equally and completely exempted from all authority whatever of the United States.” Id. 
68 Patterson v. Colorado ex rel. Att’y Gen., 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907). 
69 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
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whatsoever which is a malicious, scandalous or defamatory newspaper, as defined by 
law.”70 The Supreme Court recognized this “effective censorship” as an unconstitutional 
prior restraint and vacated the injunction, noting the Framers’ clear opposition to 
government-sanctioned prepublication restrictions: 
The exceptional nature of its limitations places in a strong light the general 
conception that liberty of the press, historically considered and taken up 
by the Federal Constitution, has meant, principally although not 
exclusively, immunity from previous restraints or censorship.71 
¶25  The presumption against prior restraints remains salient despite the exceptions and 
limitations to this doctrine discussed infra Part III.72 Decades after its holding in Near, 
the Court affirmed that “prior restraints on speech and publication are the most serious 
and the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights.”73 Part III discusses the 
implications of the prior restraint doctrine on potential government regulation addressing 
data vulnerability disclosures.   
III. PRIOR RESTRAINT APPLICATION 
A. Responsible Disclosure as a Prior Restraint  
¶26  “Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy 
presumption against its constitutional validity.”74 The Court endorsed the broad 
application of this doctrine in Near v. Minnesota,75 presuming the unconstitutionality of 
prepublication censorship imposed by state law. A government-compelled mechanism 
requiring responsible disclosure (e.g., mandatory disclosure to a company before public 
dissemination) would thus obligate the government to rebut this presumption if the policy 
restrained protected speech.  
¶27  Proponents of the responsible disclosure approach point to the potential for abuse 
in a full disclosure system to counter constitutional deficiencies.76 For instance, 
disclosing a data vulnerability might inspire “blackhat” hackers to exploit the weakness 
before a data-holder is able to resolve the threat.77 Alternatively, a party wishing to gain 
an unfair advantage over a competitor might anonymously report a data breach, resulting 
in reputational damage and decreased user-traffic for the affected data-holder, regardless 
 
70 Id. at 703. 
71 Id. at 716. 
72 See infra Part III(B). 
73 Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976). 
74 See Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963); see also Neb. Press Ass’n, 427 U.S. at 
592; Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483, 491 (1973); N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 
(1971); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 57 (1965). 
75 283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
76 See ALANA MAURUSHAT, DISCLOSURE OF SECURITY VULNERABILITIES: LEGAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES 
(2013) (outlining the disclosure debate and problems with full disclosure). 
77 Jonathan Trull, Responsible Disclosure: Cyber Security Ethics, CSO (Feb. 26, 2015, 5:27 AM), 
http://www.csoonline.com/article/2889357/security0/responsible-disclosure-cyber-security-ethics.html 
(“The argument for responsible disclosure is that blackhats—cyber criminals—can typically exploit the 
vulnerability when publicly disclosed much quicker than those who are attacked can fix the issue.”). 
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of the disclosure’s veracity. Yet, while this potential for unlawful abuse prompts some 
concerns, the mere possibility of exploitative conduct does not justify quashing First 
Amendment rights: “The fact that the liberty of the press may be abused by miscreant 
purveyors of scandal does not make any the less necessary the immunity of the press 
from previous restraint.”78 In short, the presence of a few bad actors should not compel 
the preemptive restriction of constitutionally protected speech. And although punishment 
following public disclosure might be constitutionally sound in certain instances, the 
possibility of future legal recourse does not alleviate a prior restraint regime’s inherent 
constitutional infirmity.79  
¶28  Furthermore, the fact that a policy might allow the publication of a data weakness 
following a company’s resolution thereof does not rectify these constitutional issues. 
Delay, not just outright prohibition of publication, may constitute a prior restraint. For 
example, the Supreme Court in Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart struck down a court 
order restricting pretrial reporting of confessions in a popular murder trial.80 The Court 
noted:  
The order at issue . . . does not prohibit but only postpones publication. 
Some news can be delayed and most commentary can even more readily 
be delayed without serious injury, and there often is a self-imposed delay 
when responsible editors call for verification of information. But such 
delays are normally slight and they are self-imposed. Delays imposed by 
governmental authority are a different matter.81 
In reaching its holding, the Court focused not on the content of the publication but on the 
potential damage caused by a delay and its source—the government—in determining that 
the court order violated First Amendment rights.  
¶29  Government-imposed delays are a “different matter” because they are neither 
“slight” nor “self-imposed.”82 Like any other impermissible restraint, what makes this 
type of censorship unconstitutional is its impact on free speech. More precisely, the 
adverse effects of a lengthy delay (e.g., the extent of potential harm) and the degree of 
free speech quashed (e.g., the amount of editorial discretion stymied) determine the 
restriction’s constitutionality. Accordingly, with regard to prepublication censorship, the 
greater the amount of harm caused and speech-discretion stifled, the more likely the 
restraint violates First Amendment rights.  
¶30  Addressing these factors in the data security context, a government-imposed 
publication delay should be analogously impermissible. In fact, the likely effects of a 
responsible disclosure policy suggest it would be even less constitutionally sound than 
the court order struck down in Nebraska Press. In data security cases, for instance, 
delaying news of a data vulnerability could significantly alter the initially intended 
message and its corresponding importance. While the consequences of disclosure might 
 
78 283 U.S. at 720. 
79 See id. (“Subsequent punishment for such abuses as may exist is the appropriate remedy, consistent 
with constitutional privilege.”). 
80 See 427 U.S. 539. 
81 Id. at 560. 
82 Id.  
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be uncertain initially, delay poses a risk of serious injury to those whose data is 
exposed—an injury that can be substantially mitigated, if not altogether avoided, if notice 
of a breach is provided without delay. Moreover, individual security researchers or news 
editors may choose to delay publication, for example, when they believe publication 
might violate privacy rights or a source’s credibility needs confirmation. Companies may 
also provide incentives for those who discover vulnerabilities to delay disclosure.83 
Coupled with the potential for widespread harm, the amount of discretion stifled—
namely the various alternatives to public disclosure—prompts serious constitutional 
concerns for any responsible disclosure policy. 
¶31  In addition, the special character of the press and the role it plays in society 
highlights why even short delays in publication can have pernicious consequences. As 
society adapts to a twenty-four-hour news cycle, the expectation of timeliness has never 
been more prominent: “As a practical matter, moreover, the element of time is not 
unimportant if press coverage is to fulfill its traditional function of bringing news to the 
public promptly.”84 Though immediate access to a news story may have been impossible 
when news came only in the form of a daily paper, the advent of the Internet demands 
immediate reporting. News outlets that fail to adapt to this rapid news cycle will likely 
lose readers because consumers do not expect to wait for news of any significance.85 And 
as discussed previously, immediacy is of particular importance with respect to data 
security because punctual reporting allows consumers to take cautionary steps to protect 
their personal information, with even the slightest delay potentially resulting in mass 
exploitation of consumer data.  
¶32  Nevertheless, the presumption against prior restraints is not absolute. A more 
complete understanding of the constitutionality of a government-endorsed vulnerability 
disclosure policy requires consideration of the value of the speech protected and the 
government’s interests in delaying disclosure. 
B. Protecting Vulnerability Speech 
¶33  The First Amendment provides more protection for ex ante speech than ex post 
speech. As the Supreme Court recognized in Nebraska Press, “The First Amendment . . . 
accords greater protection against prior restraints than it does against subsequent 
punishment for a particular speech.”86 The reason for this temporal distinction finds itself 
in the fundamental principle that censoring free speech discourages the development and 
protection of a marketplace of ideas: 
[A] free society prefers to punish the few who abuse rights of speech after 
they break the law than to throttle them and all others beforehand. It is 
always difficult to know in advance what an individual will say, and the 
 
83 See supra notes 161–66 and accompanying text. 
84 Neb. Press Ass’n, 427 U.S. at 561. 
85 See, e.g., Liane Hansen & David Folkenflik, The Power of the 24-Hour News Cycle, NAT’L PUB. 
RADIO (May 29, 2005, 12:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4671485. 
 86 Neb. Press Ass’n, 427 U.S. at 589 (citing Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 180–81 (1968)). 
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line between legitimate and illegitimate speech is often so finely drawn 
that the risks of freewheeling censorship are formidable.87 
Determining the extent of First Amendment protection for after-the-fact vulnerability 
speech requires fact-specific, case-by-case analysis and not a restrictive, prophylactic 
responsible-disclosure mandate.  
¶34  Because of this aversion to censorship, courts may consider the context of the 
disclosure and the motivation of the parties involved in determining the extent of First 
Amendment protection. Pertinent to data vulnerability disclosures, this context-based 
approach provides guidance in determining the level of constitutional protection for the 
dissemination of computer code or, more precisely, whether computer code constitutes 
protected speech under the First Amendment and how far this protection might extend.88 
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals illustrated this approach in Ostergen v. Cuccinelli, 
where it held that First Amendment protection extended to the disclosure of social 
security numbers because the disclosure was meant to convey a message about the 
inappropriateness of the state’s treatment of documents containing private information.89 
While disclosing social security numbers is not itself protected speech, the context 
elevated the otherwise unprotected speech content to protected expression.  
¶35  Thus, under the reasoning of Ostergen, even if code alone is not protected speech, 
various situations could similarly elevate the disclosure of computer code to allow First 
Amendment protection. Computer code, for instance, can be integral to conveying the 
veracity and importance of resolving data security vulnerabilities.90 Keeping this in mind, 
disseminated code more likely comprises protected speech in scenarios with the most 
pervasive and complex data exposures. Accordingly, as the potential damage of a data 
breach increases, the necessity of computer code also increases, supporting the extension 
of First Amendment protection following dissemination. Yet the most significant 
takeaway from employing this context-based approach goes far beyond its application to 
computer code. Indeed, it is simply the fact that computer code—in its perfunctory and 
mechanical form—can amount to protected speech even after publication that is critical, 
granting further constitutional vindication for vulnerability-speech protection. 
¶36  Most importantly, data security is a matter of public concern, which makes the 
potential harm caused by prior restraints and delays more salient. The Supreme Court 
 
 87 Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 559 (1975). 
 88 Courts and scholars alike have been reasoning through this debate. See, e.g., Universal City Studios, 
Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001); Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481 (6th Cir. 2000); Bernstein v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 192 F.3d 1308 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Dan Burk, Patenting Speech, 79 TEX. L. REV. 
99 (2000); Orin Kerr, Are We Overprotecting Code?: Thoughts on First-Generation Internet Law, 57 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1287 (2000); Ethan Preston & John Lofton, Computer Security Publications: 
Information Economics, Shifting Liability, and the First Amendment, 24 WHITTIER L. REV. 71 (2002); Lee 
Tien, Publishing Software as a Speech Act, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 629 (2000). Though a compelling 
issue, this Article will not thoroughly address the role of code in vulnerability speech and the implications 
it may have on First Amendment protection and analysis. This debate need not be resolved in order to 
decide whether First Amendment protection against prior restraints may extend to vulnerability speech that 
incorporates code. 
89 See generally Ostergen v. Cuccinelli, 615 F.3d 263 (4th Cir. 2010). 
 90 See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS 228 (2006) (recognizing that news reporting 
online is most effective when the “[t]he first move . . . is to make the raw materials available for all to 
see”). 
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recognized the need to account for the public interest in prior restraint cases, specifically 
acknowledging in Nebraska Press that “[t]he damage can be particularly great when the 
prior restraint falls upon the communication of news and commentary on current 
events.”91 In addition to contemporaneousness, speech constitutes a matter of public 
concern when it relates to political, social, or community issues.92 It is difficult to 
imagine that data security information fails to qualify as a matter of public concern of the 
type contemplated by the Court.  
¶37  Empirical evidence supports this argument, showing that most modern consumers 
fear the loss of personal information through a data breach. Even before Target’s data 
breach personally affected millions of consumers, concern over the security of personal 
data was endemic. For example, a survey conducted in March 2013 revealed that 82.1% 
of Americans were at least somewhat worried about a data breach involving banks, 
government entities, or other organizations, and roughly the same percentage were 
concerned about identity theft and credit-card fraud.93 This wariness remains significant. 
Since the breach at Target—and breaches at many other retailers—over half of those 
surveyed said that an actual security breach would make them less likely to do business 
with the bank or store breached.94 And with over 78-million data records containing 
personal information exposed to breaches in the first ten months of 2014 alone, it is 
unsurprising that a separate survey found that 77% of consumers agreed that prompt 
notification of vulnerabilities involving stolen or lost data was important.95 Because of 
this fear, state legislatures—typically the primary enactors of consumer-protection 
laws—have passed various data-breach-notification statutes, requiring companies to 
inform customers of significant security breaches involving personal information, which 
reinforces the stance that protecting private information and promoting mitigation upon 
breach is irrefutably a matter of public concern.96 
¶38  State legislatures are not alone. The Executive branch has recognized the broader 
importance of cybersecurity, instating a National Cybersecurity Initiative and identifying 
“cybersecurity as one of the most serious economic and national security challenges we 
face as a nation, but one that we as a government or as a country are not adequately 
prepared to counter.”97 Before the 2015 State of the Union address, President Obama 
 
91 Neb. Press Ass’n, 427 U.S. at 559. 
92 See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1211 (2011) (“Although the boundaries of what constitutes 
speech on matters of public concern are not well defined, this Court has said that speech is of public 
concern when it can ‘be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to 
the community,’ or when it ‘is a subject of general interest and of value and concern to the public.’”) 
(internal citations omitted). 
 93 LIEBERMAN RESEARCH GRP., UNISYS SECURITY INDEX: US, UNISYS (Apr. 18, 2013), available at 
http://www.unisyssecurityindex.com/system/reports/uploads/288/original/Unisys%20Security%20Index_U
nited%20States_May%202013.pdf?1370347491. 
94 LIEBERMAN RESEARCH GRP., UNISYS SECURITY INDEX: US, UNISYS (May 13, 2014), available at 
http://www.unisyssecurityindex.com/system/reports/uploads/303/original/Unisys%20Security%20Index%2
0US%20May%202014.pdf?1399929399. 
95 EMC CORP., supra note 12. 
96 See MINTZ LEVIN, STATE DATA SECURITY BREACH NOTIFICATION LAWS (Jan. 1, 2015), available at 
http://www.mintz.com/newsletter/2007/PrivSec-DataBreachLaws-02-07/state_data_breach_matrix.pdf 
(providing a chart of state-enacted notification laws). 
97 The Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative, WHITE HOUSE, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/foreign-policy/cybersecurity/national-initiative (last visited Mar. 18, 
2014).  
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reaffirmed his administration’s commitment to cybersecurity and detailed various 
proposals to combat cyber threats, including a proposal for a federal data-breach-
notification law.98 Though data vulnerabilities and corporate responsibility constitute a 
small sliver of a larger cybersecurity problem, the disclosure issue nevertheless remains a 
prominent, unresolved challenge. 
C. Permissible Prior Restraints 
¶39  Although the presumption against prior restraints is strong, it is not absolute. The 
Supreme Court has recognized limitations to the prior restraint doctrine that permit 
prepublication restrictions on speech. However, qualifying for an exception requires 
meeting a high evidentiary threshold: the Government “carries a heavy burden of 
showing justification for the imposition of . . . a [prior] restraint,”99 and the recognized 
exceptions are “extremely difficult to justify.”100 Although some danger may be posed by 
the publication of information about a data vulnerability, this Article posits that any 
formal adoption of a responsible disclosure policy invariably fails to meet this heavy 
burden.  
¶40  The Supreme Court in Near v. Minnesota held that an injunction against a 
newspaper for exposing illicit activities of state politicians constituted an unconstitutional 
prior restraint.101 In dicta, however, the Court acknowledged that prior restraints might be 
appropriate in limited circumstances: 
[T]he protection even as to previous restraint is not absolutely unlimited. 
But the limitation has been recognized only in exceptional cases. “When a 
nation is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are such a 
hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as 
men fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by any 
constitutional right.” No one would question but that a government might 
prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting service or the publication of the 
sailing dates of transports or the number and location of troops. On similar 
grounds, the primary requirements of decency may be enforced against 
obscene publications. The security of the community life may be protected 
against incitements to acts of violence and the overthrow by force of 
orderly government.102 
Of particular relevance to vulnerability speech is the “national-security exception” Near 
identifies, also referred to as the “military-security exception,” which permits prior 
restraints when there is an immediate risk to national security. 
¶41  Two cases—New York Times Co. v. United States103 and United States v. 
Progressive104—illustrate the extraordinary circumstances necessary to meet the national-
 
98 Safeguarding American Consumers & Families, supra note 16. 
99 Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971); see also N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 
403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971). 
100 Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 592 (1976). 
101 See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
 102 Id. at 716 (quoting Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919)). 
103 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
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security exception for prior restraints. In New York Times Co., the Supreme Court 
reviewed the Government’s motion for an injunction against the New York Times and the 
Washington Post preventing publication of the “Pentagon Papers,” which included 
classified details about the United States’ involvement in Vietnam.105 Though there was 
no majority opinion, a per curiam opinion declared that the Government had not met its 
“heavy burden” of justifying a prior restraint,106 notwithstanding the fact that a majority 
of Justices acknowledged that the release of the top-secret documents would in fact harm 
national security—some even noting that the newspapers might face prosecution after 
publication under various espionage statutes.107 Even after recognizing this harm, the 
Court refused to permit a prior restraint. Of the six Justices who authored concurrences, 
two asserted that First Amendment protection absolutely precludes prior restraints,108 
while the remaining four construed the national-security exception narrowly.109  
¶42  Less than a decade after the Supreme Court decided New York Times Co., the 
national-security exception was successfully raised in a U.S. District Court in 
Wisconsin.110 Amidst the height of the Cold War, the district court reviewed an 
injunction under the Atomic Energy Act that prevented the Progressive from publishing a 
“how to” article on building a hydrogen bomb.111 Recognizing that “few things, save 
grave national security concerns, are sufficient to override First Amendment interests,” 
the court enjoined the defendant from publishing the article112 because it provided 
sufficient information for a nation to expedite its development of a hydrogen bomb and 
provided little value to any public debate over atomic weapons.113 Unlike the Pentagon 
Papers, this publication contained contemporary information that could affect the nation’s 
security during wartime.114 Relying on the Supreme Court’s military-security language in 
Near, the district court concluded that “publication of the technical information on the 
hydrogen bomb contained in the article is analogous to publication of troop movements 
or locations in time of war and falls within the extremely narrow exception to the rule 
against prior restraint.”115 Drawing specifically from Justice Stewart’s concurrence in 
 
104 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979). 
105 See 403 U.S. 713. 
106 Id. at 714. 
107 See id. at 720–24 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 730–40 (White, J., concurring); id. at 740–48 
(Marshall, J., concurring); id. at 748–52 (Burger, J., dissenting); id. at 759–62 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); 
Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 591–92 (1976). 
108 See N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. at 714–20 (Black, J., concurring); id. at 720–24 (Douglas, J., 
concurring). 
109 See id. at 724–27 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“[G]overnmental allegation and proof that publication 
must inevitably, directly, and immediately cause the occurrence of an event kindred to imperiling the safety 
of a transport already at sea . . . . [But] [i]n no event may mere conclusions be sufficient.”); id. at 727–30 
(Stewart, J., concurring) (requiring “direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to our Nation or its 
people”); id. at 730–40 (White, J., concurring) (recognizing that even demonstrating that “revelation of 
these documents will do substantial damage to public interests” is insufficient to overcome the 
“extraordinary protection against prior restraints”); id. at 740–48 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
110 See United States v. Progressive, 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979). 
111 See id. 
112 See id. at 992, 997. 
113 See id. at 993–94. “A mistake in ruling against the United States could pave the way for 
thermonuclear annihilation for us all. In that event, our right to life is extinguished and the right to publish 
becomes moot.” Id. at 996. 
114 See id. at 994. 
115 Id. at 996. 
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New York Times Co.,116 the court asserted that the United States met its burden of 
demonstrating grave, immediate harm to the nation.  
¶43  Though little guidance exists for how to balance national security interests with 
freedom of the press, disclosure of data vulnerabilities unlikely poses a sufficiently 
significant threat to national security for the Government to meet this heavy burden. 
Crucially, data vulnerabilities are primarily a matter of concern between consumers and 
retailers or financial institutions. The exploitation of a vulnerability most often implicates 
consumer-data privacy and company reputations, not national security. With this in mind, 
the Supreme Court has noted on numerous occasions that the invasion of privacy is 
insufficient to support an injunction against the press.117 The fact that the majority of data 
breaches threaten privacy rights rather than U.S.-state interests—let alone national 
security interests—makes justifying any government-imposed preventative measures 
incredibly difficult. Furthermore, the severity of harm resulting from the revelation of a 
data vulnerability is far less than that presented by instructions on composing an atomic 
bomb. To be sure, the damage that could result from the exploitation of data—fraud and 
identity theft likely being the most extreme—pales in comparison to the substantial loss 
of life that could result from nuclear proliferation. In this same vein, but to a lesser 
degree, the revelation of former military strategies in the Pentagon Papers posed a more 
grave, immediate, and irreparable harm than consumer fraud.  
¶44  Yet, while data security breaches are predominantly a concern for consumers, the 
U.S. government and state governments are similarly susceptible. For example, in the 
first few months of 2014 alone, the U.S. Veterans of Foreign Wars website was 
hacked,118 California’s Department of Motor Vehicles online credit-card database was 
breached,119 data tables on several government websites were manipulated,120 and a bug 
shut down PACER.121 Government websites, like any other, are vulnerable to 
exploitation.  
¶45  But government-website data breaches that implicate national security are rare.122 
In light of this realistic infrequency, legislation concerning vulnerability speech would 
 
116 See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 730 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“But I 
cannot say that disclosure of any of them will surely result in direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to 
our Nation or its people.”). 
117 See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001); Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 558 
(1976); Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 418–20 (1971); see also Samuel D. Warren & 
Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 214 (1890–91) (“The right of privacy does 
not prohibit any publication of matter which is of public or general interest.”). 
118 Kristin Bergman, Hackers Take Aim at Veterans That Use Internet Explorer, IT-LEX (Feb. 24, 2014), 
http://it-lex.org/hackers-take-aim-at-veterans-that-use-internet-explorer/. 
119 Kate Mather & Carla Rivera, Possible Breach of DMV Online Customers’ Credit Card Data 
Reported, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2014, 12:34 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-california-
dmv-breach-20140322,0,5390096.story#axzz2wkDWoEiq. 
120 Jeryl Bier, Opportunistic Marketers Exploit Opening at Healthcare.gov, WKLY. STANDARD (Jan. 23, 
2014, 7:04 AM), http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/opportunistic-marketers-exploit-opening-
healthcaregov_775259.html; Jeryl Bier, Widespread Vulnerability Found in Dozens of Government “Open 
Data” Websites, WKLY. STANDARD (Feb. 20, 2014, 8:07 AM), 
https://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/widespread-vulnerability-found-dozens-government-open-data-
websites_782700.html. 
121 Devlin Barrett, FBI: Glitches, Not Cyberattack, Disrupted Court Websites, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 24, 
2014, 11:25 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240527023034482045793415233489 
86810. 
122 Take, for example, data breaches in 2014. At the end of the year and in early 2015, dozens of 
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likely implicate the First Amendment’s “overbreadth doctrine.” The overbreadth doctrine 
“is an exception to the established principle that ‘a person to whom a statute may 
constitutionally be applied will not be heard to challenge that statute on the ground that it 
may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others, in other situations not before the 
Court.’”123 Thus, even a defendant whose speech or activities fall outside First 
Amendment protection may challenge a law’s constitutionality when “the possible harm 
to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the 
possibility that protected speech of others may be muted.”124 But for a facial challenge to 
the validity of an entire statute to succeed, its overbreadth “must not only be real but 
substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.”125 Thus, 
while a vulnerability may threaten national security to such a degree that it satisfies the 
military-security exception, the vast amount of protected speech “muted” by responsible 
disclosure legislation likely precludes the constitutionality of such a heavy-handed 
approach.126 Stated differently, this type of legislation’s over-inclusiveness would be both 
real and substantial, stifling myriad instances of protected speech while only minimally 
benefitting national security.  
¶46  Rather than legislating a general vulnerability policy, these extreme scenarios 
should be resolved in a less restrictive manner. This may involve case-by-case 
determinations requiring fact-specific analyses or narrowly-tailored legislation regulating 
disclosure of vulnerabilities in government computer systems. Adopting a responsible 
disclosure policy for all data security vulnerabilities is not an appropriately tailored 
response for the limited circumstances that might qualify for the national-security 
exception. 
D. Procedural Requirements 
¶47  In addition to these substantive challenges, any legislation mandating a responsible 
disclosure policy would need to satisfy the procedural requirements established in 
 
organizations expounded upon what they considered the most significant breaches. Notably, very few of 
these breaches implicated national security, and arguably none reached the severity required to satisfy the 
national-security exception to the prior restraint doctrine. See, e.g., Bitium, The Biggest Data Breaches and 
Hacks of 2014, RE/CODE (Feb. 10, 2015, 12:05 PM), http://recode.net/2015/02/10/the-biggest-data-
breaches-and-hacks-of-2014/; Khidr Suleman, Biggest Hacks of 2014: From Apple to eBay, No-One Is 
Safe, ITPRO (Dec. 8, 2014), http://www.itpro.co.uk/security/23673/biggest-hacks-of-2014-from-apple-to-
ebay-no-one-is-safe; Zack Whittaker, 2014 In Security: The Biggest Hacks, Leaks, and Data Breaches, 
ZDNET (Dec. 28, 2014, 6:32 PM), http://www.zdnet.com/pictures/2014-in-security-the-biggest-hacks-
leaks-and-data-breaches/. Even the seemingly dangerous hack of U.S. Central Command’s Twitter feed by 
ISIS sympathizers was just that—a social media account hack resulting in fear and embarrassment, not a 
breach of intelligence information. The Twitter account’s vulnerability was exploited for what CENTCOM 
called “cybervandalism”; there was no risk of exposure of classified information by the hack.  See Dan 
Lamothe, U.S. Military Social Media Accounts Apparently Hacked by Islamic State Sympathizers, WASH. 
POST (Jan. 13, 2015, 12:53 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2015/01/12/ 
centcom-twitter-account-apparently-hacked-by-islamic-state-sympathizers/. 
123 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 412 (1992) (citing Broaderick v. Oklahoma, 413 
U.S. 601, 610 (1973)). 
124 Broaderick, 413 U.S. at 612. 
125 Id. at 615. 
126 Indeed, an early 2015 hack of U.S. Central Command’s Twitter account hints at the type of 
vulnerability that may satisfy this exception. Paul D. Shinkman, U.S. Central Command Twitter Account 
Suspended After Apparent ISIS Hack, U.S. NEWS (Jan. 12, 2015, 2:06 PM), http://www.usnews.com/ 
news/articles/2015/01/12/us-central-command-twitter-account-suspended-after-apparent-isis-hack. 
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Freedman v. Maryland.127 In Freedman, the Supreme Court struck down a state law that 
required censors to approve films before allowing them in theatres, aiming to screen out 
films that were obscene or likely to incite crime.128 Analogously, a responsible disclosure 
policy requires a review process mandating “submission” to the affected company, which 
in turn obligates the would-be discloser to refrain from publishing his findings until either 
a predetermined amount of time elapses or the company approves.129   
¶48  Freedman set forth four procedural requirements for any such censoring system to 
survive First Amendment scrutiny. The Court held that “a noncriminal process which 
requires the prior submission of a film to a censor avoids constitutional infirmity only if it 
takes place under procedural safeguards designed to obviate the dangers of a censorship 
system.”130 The Court went on to outline these safeguards: 
First, the burden of proving that the film is unprotected expression must 
rest on the censor. . . . Second, while the State may require advance 
submission . . . the requirement cannot be administered in a manner which 
would lend an effect of finality to the censor’s determination whether a 
film constitutes protected expression. . . . [O]nly a procedure requiring a 
judicial determination suffices to impose a valid final restraint. . . . 
[Third,] the exhibitor must be assured, by statute or authoritative judicial 
construction, that the censor will, within a specified brief period, either 
issue a license or go to court to restrain showing the film . . . and must 
similarly be limited to preservation of the status quo for the shortest fixed 
period compatible with sound judicial resolution. . . . [Fourth,] the 
procedure must also assure a prompt final judicial decision, to minimize 
the deterrent effect of an interim and possibly erroneous denial of a 
license.131 
These procedural safeguards must be in place for any prior-submission form of 
censorship to survive First Amendment scrutiny.132 
¶49  Moreover, in the context of vulnerability disclosures, many commercial incentives 
exist making a responsible disclosure policy ripe for abuse, increasing the necessity of 
these procedural safeguards. For instance, facing potential embarrassment and 
reputational damage resulting from the revelation of a vulnerability, data-holders may 
feel threatened by external data-security inspections. Fearing exposure of data security 
deficiencies, companies may not cooperate with security experts or, worse yet, refuse to 
acknowledge clear security defects following an inspection. And, now more than ever, 
successful directors and corporate executives are often measured not by long-term growth 
but by recent share prices, increasing the temptation to conceal data weaknesses from the 
 
127 Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965). 
128 See id. 
129 See ORG. FOR INTERNET SAFETY, supra note 22. 
130 Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58. 
131 Id. at 58–60. 
132 Id. at 57–58 (“Because the censor’s business is to censor, there inheres the danger that he may well 
be less responsive than a court—part of an independent branch of government—to the constitutionally 
protected interests in free expression. And if it is made unduly onerous, by reason of delay or otherwise, to 
seek judicial review, the censor’s determination may in practice be final.”). 
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public and avoid confronting any shortcomings head-on.133 Thus, although companies 
often understandably wish to prevent the publication of data security weaknesses, 
misaligned interests coupled with the ability to conceal institutional flaws increase the 
potential for unchecked abuse, further bolstering the need for procedural safeguards in 
the data security context.   
¶50  Therefore, even if Congress were to draft a responsible disclosure bill sufficiently 
tailored to pass substantive constitutional review, Congress would still need to put in 
place adequate procedural safeguards. Specifically, the legislation must include 
provisions that: (1) place the burden on the data-holder to show the disclosure implicates 
unprotected expression; (2) ensure the data-holder’s decision does not “lend an effect of 
finality”; (3) limit the delay to a brief period; and (4) provide for expedited judicial 
review.134   
IV. EDITORIAL PROTECTIONS OF THE PRESS 
¶51  As desirable as it may seem, mandating a privacy-conscious press is antithetical to 
First Amendment principles. Notwithstanding certain exceptional circumstances, courts 
must not interfere with editorial discretion to force responsible newsgathering and 
publication. “Bad conduct never justifies prior restraint,” and “the Supreme Court has 
held consistently to the view that newsgathering conduct by itself never justifies 
enjoining publication.”135 Regardless of the means by which a third party procured 
information, if the press obtains this information through lawful newsgathering, First 
Amendment protection applies.136 Thus, even if a policy applies only to vulnerability 
information that a source obtained illegally, a policy preventing publication of this 
information would impermissibly restrain freedom of the press.  
¶52  The principle that a source’s conduct should not affect the press’s right to 
disseminate remains salient. The Court first articulated this in Bartnicki v. Vopper,137 
where a local radio station anonymously received an illegally recorded discussion 
between a union president and chief negotiator.138 The Court refused to enjoin the 
 
133 See Leo Strine, Jr., One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question We Face: Can Corporations 
Be Managed for the Long Term Unless Their Powerful Electorates also Act and Think Long Term?, BUS. 
LAW., Nov. 2010, at 1, 16 (“[I]f the electorate . . . does not push an agenda that appropriately focuses on the 
long term, the responsiveness of managers to the incentives they face can result in business strategies that 
involve excessive risk . . . .”); see also Dominick Barton & Mark Wiseman, Where Boards Fall Short, 
HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.–Feb. 2015. 
134 See Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58–60. 
135 Robert M. O’Neil, Tainted Sources: First Amendment Rights and Journalistic Wrongs, 4 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 1005, 1024 (1996). 
136 See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 535 (2001) (“[A] stranger’s illegal conduct does not suffice to 
remove the First Amendment shield from speech about a matter of public concern.”). 
137 See id. 
138 Id. Analogous to the intersection of data security and vulnerability speech, the Court began by 
recognizing the conflict posed by evolving technology: 
 
[T]hese cases present a conflict between interests of the highest order—on the one hand, 
the interest in the full and free dissemination of information concerning public issues, 
and, on the other hand, the interest in individual privacy. . . . The Framers of the First 
Amendment surely did not foresee the advances in science that produced the 
conversation, the interception, or the conflict that gave rise to this action.  
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publication, stating, “[A] stranger’s illegal conduct does not suffice to remove the First 
Amendment shield from speech about a matter of public concern.”139 Specifically, the 
Court highlighted three factors in making this decision: (1) the press had no role in the 
illegal interception; (2) the press obtained access to the recording lawfully; and (3) the 
recording depicted a matter of public concern.140 Applying Bartnicki to a typical 
vulnerability-disclosure scenario, a news outlet would meet the first two factors by 
showing that a security researcher, acting legally or illegally, uncovered a data weakness 
and conveyed this information to a member of the press on the security researcher’s own 
prerogative. As for the third factor, information about data security breaches often 
implicates millions of consumers,141 undoubtedly fulfilling the public-concern inquiry 
articulated in Bartnicki, which involved collective-bargaining negotiations between a 
local schoolboard and a teacher’s union.142 Therefore, in the most likely vulnerability-
disclosure scenario, neither the press’s right to publish nor the government’s interest in 
imposing a prior restraint are affected by a source’s wrongful conduct.143  
¶53  Beyond these constitutional issues, governmental interference prompts credibility 
issues as well. Journalists, serving in their capacities as members of the press, possess a 
unique expertise, often from years of experience. Journalistic ethics also impose 
accountability, demanding that journalists remain credible in the eyes of the public. The 
significance of journalist credibility is matched only by its fragility, evinced by the public 
downfall of some of the most prominent members of the press.144 Judges, on the other 
hand, have no such expertise, and, at least with respect to federal judges and appointed 
state judges, remain mostly isolated from the demands of the public. As the Fifth Circuit 
recognized: 
Courts are not equipped, staffed, or trained to meet the public interest by 
choosing among the programming interests to be served. Converting 
courts into super-editors, in derogation of the press freedom guaranteed by 
 
Id. at 518. As surely as the Framers did not anticipate the evolution of sophisticated recording devices, they 
could not have anticipated the “Cyber Age” we live in today and the technological advances that would 
produce data security, vulnerabilities, and the discovery thereof.  
139 Id. at 535.  
140 Id. at 525. 
141 See supra Part III(B). 
142 Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 518. 
143 Though not as clearly articulated, the Court in New York Times Co. similarly allowed publication 
regardless of a source’s illegal acquisition of information. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 
714–15 (1971). When considering the prior restraint, the Court made little of source Daniel Ellsberg’s 
acquisition of the Pentagon Papers, apparently ignoring this aspect and resting its decision on entirely 
different grounds. Id.; see O’Neil, supra note 135, at 1009. Ultimately, the Justices struck down the prior 
restraint, despite the fact that the source had stolen the documents.  See N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. at 713–
14. However, writing in dissent, Justice Blackmun exclaimed, “I strongly urge, and sincerely hope, that 
these two newspapers will be fully aware of their ultimate responsibilities to the United State of America.” 
Id. at 762 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
144 See, e.g., More Fallout from Brian Williams Reporting Scandal, CBS NEWS (Feb. 20, 2015),  
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/more-fallout-from-brian-williams-reporting-scandal/; CBS News Admits 
Bush Documents Can’t Be Verified, NBC NEWS, http://www.nbcnews.com/id/6055248/ns/politics/t/cbs-
news-admits-bush-documents-cant-be-verified/#.VOv6iPnF-8A (last updated Sept. 21, 2004). 
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the First Amendment, would be not only unprecedented, unwise, and 
unwelcome; it would be unconstitutional.145 
¶54  Of course, the press might sometimes make irresponsible decisions when deciding 
what stories to publish. But this alone does not justify judicial or legislative intervention: 
“A responsible press is an undoubtedly desirable goal, but press responsibility is not 
mandated by the Constitution and like many other virtues it cannot be legislated.”146 The 
First Amendment ensures that news editors maintain discretion to determine what 
material to publish. Governmental adoption of a responsible disclosure policy would 
restrict the press’s speech on an issue of public concern, which the First Amendment was 
specifically designed to prevent. Barring extreme circumstances, the government cannot 
regulate this editorial function without violating one of the most fundamental 
constitutional guarantees.147 
V. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
¶55  Inhibiting the disclosure of data vulnerabilities also raises various policy concerns. 
Part V(A) discusses how allowing vulnerability disclosures encourages speech about data 
security, whereas a responsible disclosure policy, like any other prior restraint, creates a 
chilling effect on the beneficial dissemination of vital information. In light of this likely 
chilling effect, Part V(B) turns to how disclosure facilitates resolution of data 
vulnerabilities and mitigates the severity of harm caused by breaches. Part V(C) evaluates 
this Article’s assertions by analyzing the “Heartbleed bug,” which initially caused panic 
in early 2014. 
A. Public Debate and Chilling Effects 
¶56  At the heart of the First Amendment is our “profound national commitment to the 
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”148 
And as Chief Justice Warren Burger stated, “A prior restraint, by contrast and by 
definition, has an immediate and irreversible sanction. If it can be said that a threat of 
criminal or civil sanctions after publication ‘chills’ speech, prior restraint ‘freezes’ it at 
least for the time.”149 As discussed supra Part III(B), data security is undoubtedly a 
matter of public concern, and its growing influence on daily life is unlikely to abate. As 
technology develops, the collection and storage of important data correspondingly 
increases, causing data security and privacy to become steadily more vital. This 
 
145 Muir v. Ala. Educ. Television Comm’n, 656 F.2d 1012, 1024 (5th Cir. 1981), aff’d in part, rev’d in 
part, 688 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir. 1982). 
146 Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256 (1974). 
147 Id. at 258 (“The choice of material to go into a newspaper . . . and treatment of public issues and 
public officials—whether fair or unfair—constitute the exercise of editorial control and judgment. It has yet 
to be demonstrated how governmental regulation of this crucial process can be exercised consistent with 
First Amendment guarantees of a free press as they have evolved to this time.”); see also id. at 261 (White, 
J., concurring) (“[W]e have never thought that the First Amendment permitted public officials to dictate to 
the press the contents of its news columns or the slant of its editorials.”). 
148 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
149 Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  J O U R N A L  O F  T E C H N O L O G Y  A N D  I N T E L L E C T U A L  P R O P E R T Y  [ 2 0 1 5  
 
 142
unprecedented societal reliance on highly complex innovation warrants robust public 
debate.   
¶57  But adopting a responsible disclosure policy would inhibit public discourse over 
data security. Indeed, responsible disclosure would not merely chill debate150 but freeze it 
at its most critical moments—when data is no longer secure. In an effort to protect 
business interests, this policy would sacrifice public knowledge for consumer ignorance, 
making reputational damage-control more manageable for data-holders after a breach. 
Ultimately, inhibiting disclosure would keep the “marketplace of ideas” from serving its 
historic function.  
¶58  In a similar vein, a responsible disclosure policy would spark public antipathy.151 In 
light of the widespread public fear discussed supra Part III(B), consumers are unlikely to 
respond positively after discovering data-holders concealed information of a breach, 
especially if prompt notification could have mitigated any inflicted harm. On the 
contrary, disclosure works as an equalizing force, letting consumers gain some semblance 
of control over their personal information. Speaking of the importance of robust public 
debate and equal access, security-expert Bruce Schneier suggests:  
This democratization is important. If a known vulnerability exists . . . 
[w]ord will eventually get out—the [w]indow of [e]xposure will grow—
but you have no control, or knowledge, of when or how. All you can do is 
hope that the bad guys don’t find out before the good guys fix the 
problem. Full disclosure means that everyone gets the information at the 
same time, and everyone can act on it.152 
¶59  By giving consumers the opportunity to engage in self-help, equal access to 
information about data vulnerabilities essentially works as a safety valve, allowing 
individuals to ensure their financial wellbeing. Few policy choices are more reviled than 
those that restrict the dissemination of vital information.153 Any policy that limits 
disclosure deters critically-important information from reaching the public when it is 
most necessary, ultimately harming not only those affected by a breach, but also 
consumer confidence as a whole. 
B. Corporate Accountability and Vulnerability Resolution 
¶60  Vulnerability disclosures also inspire data security innovation. Unrestrained 
disclosure places a prospective burden on data-holders, acting as both a catalyst for 
change and a market constraint. In short, vulnerability disclosures promote fundamental, 
free-market economic principles. In Professor Eugene Volokh’s words:  
 
150 See generally Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the Chilling 
Effect, 58 B.U. L. REV. 685, 689 (1978) (“The very essence of a chilling effect is an act of deterrence.”). 
 151 See Eugene Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1095, 1111–21 (2005). 
152 Schneier, supra note 20.  
153 See, e.g., Jerry J. Berman, The Right to Know: Public Access to Electronic Information, in 2 NEW 
DIRECTIONS IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY: INFORMATION POLICY AND ECONOMIC POLICY 39, 55 
(Paula R. Newberg ed. 1989) (“Congress and a broad public interest and information industry coalition 
roundly condemned . . . [the Department of Defense’s] plans as a threat to the free flow of information. As 
a consequence, the policy directive . . . was rescinded and legislation was passed to restrict [the Department 
of Defense’s] authority to set computer security policy for unclassified data systems.”). 
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Publishing detailed information about a computer program’s security 
vulnerabilities may help security experts figure out how to fix the 
vulnerabilities, persuade apathetic users that there really is a serious 
problem, persuade the media and the public that some software 
manufacturer isn’t doing its job, and support calls for legislation requiring 
manufacturers to do better.154 
Professor Volokh highlights two important facets of vulnerability speech—it encourages 
both commercial accountability and security breach resolution. 
¶61  Vulnerability disclosures facilitate data-holder accountability and boost economic 
growth through marketplace competition based on perceived security strength.155 
Addressing the accountability issue during a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing 
following the Target breach, Senator Mike Lee stated, “I generally trust the market to 
create the right incentives for retailers to protect data of their customers. But consumers 
need notification of data breaches for that to work.”156 In practice, allowing nondisclosure 
of data vulnerabilities leads to companies placing less of a priority on rectifying the 
breach; unsurprisingly, these same companies are less likely to communicate an actual 
breach to the public.157 Public disclosure, or even the threat thereof, may serve as the 
primary motivating factor for speedy vulnerability resolution.158 For instance, HP’s 2015 
Cyber Risk Report found that nearly half of the attacks that occurred in 2014 exploited 
two- to four-year-old vulnerabilities, revealing the importance of this public-disclosure 
motivation.159 Ultimately, “security through obscurity” is ineffective.160 
 
154 Volokh, supra note 151, at 1118.  
155 See generally Peter P. Swire, A Model for When Disclosure Helps Security: What Is Different About 
Computer and Network Security?, 3 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 163 (2004) (suggesting a multifactor-
based disclosure model to balance security and privacy interests). 
156 Summary: Target Testifies on Massive Data Breach, supra note 14. 
157 See Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Material Vulnerabilities: Data Privacy, Corporate Information Security, 
and Securities Regulation, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 129, 181–82 (2005); see also supra notes 10–11 and 
accompanying text (describing Skype’s failure to resolve or report a significant vulnerability in a timely 
fashion). For additional examples of companies forgoing or delaying notification, see Kevin Burke, Virgin 
Mobile Fails Web Security 101, Leaves Six Million Subscriber Accounts Wide Open, KEVIN BURKE (Sept. 
17, 2012), http://kev.inburke.com/kevin/open-season-on-virgin-mobile-customer-data/ (accounting for 
Virgin Mobile’s failure to address or disclose a vulnerability after extensive notification by the researcher 
who discovered it); Exploit Sat on LA Times Website for 6 Weeks, KREBS ON SECURITY (Feb. 13, 2013), 
http://krebsonsecurity.com/2013/02/exploit-sat-on-la-times-website-for-6-weeks/ (describing the Los 
Angeles Times’s failure to identify a vulnerability for six weeks despite notification by readers and an 
outside security expert identifying it as malware); Eduard Kovacs, Experts Find Code Execution Flaw in 
PS3, Password Reset Bug in Sony Entertainment Network, SOFTPEDIA (May 29, 2013, 12:41 PM), 
http://news.softpedia.com/news/Experts-Find-Code-Execution-Flaw-in-PS3-Password-Reset-Bug-in-Sony-
Entertainment-Network-356623.shtml (describing Sony’s failure to address a high-severity security flaw 
for five months, at which point the researchers publicly disclosed information about the vulnerability); see 
also Vulnerability Disclosure Policy, CERT/CC, http://www.cert.org/kb/vul_disclosure.html (last visited 
Mar. 1, 2015) (providing that the company has the discretion to choose to never disclose some 
vulnerabilities). 
158 See Bruce Schneier, Internet Shield: Secrecy and Security, S.F. CHRON. (Mar. 2, 2003), available at 
http://www.schneier.com/essay-033.html. 
159 HP SECURITY RESEARCH, CYBER RISK REPORT (Feb. 2015), available at 
https://ssl.www8.hp.com/ww/en/secure/pdf/4aa5-0858enw.pdf. 
160 See, e.g., Matwyshyn, supra note 157; Peter P. Swire, A Theory of Disclosure for Security and 
Competitive Reasons: Open Source, Proprietary Software, and Government Systems, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 
1333, 1337 (2006). That said, this Author recognizes that “[t]he proliferation of publications providing 
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¶62  Nevertheless, some companies support disclosure, recognizing its utility in 
promoting expeditious resolution of high-risk data vulnerabilities. Most notably, in 2013 
Google adopted a revised policy for when its security researchers discover exploitation of 
publicly unknown “zero-day” vulnerabilities.161 Under this policy, Google would notify 
vendors upon discovery of data vulnerabilities that they had sixty days to resolve critical 
vulnerabilities and only seven days to resolve vulnerabilities being actively exploited.162 
If left unresolved, Google would take steps to “support researchers making details 
available so that users can take steps to protect themselves.”163 Many companies, such as 
TippingPoint and Facebook, have similar programs encouraging outside researchers and 
individual users to notify them of data security vulnerabilities.164 These initiatives often 
recognize the importance of both giving customers the opportunity to engage in self-help 
and allowing companies to rectify data vulnerabilities internally. For instance, 
TippingPoint’s “Zero Day Initiative” details: 
In order to maintain the secrecy of a researcher’s vulnerability discovery 
until a product vendor can develop a patch, TippingPoint customers are 
only given a generic description . . . . In other words, TippingPoint 
customers will be protected from the vulnerability in advance, but they 
will not be able to discern the vulnerability itself.165 
These programs and policies not only promote resolution of vulnerabilities, but also alert 
the public to take protective measures, such as by avoiding certain programs or websites, 
monitoring personal accounts, and changing passwords.166 
¶63  Vulnerability disclosures also indirectly facilitate consumer self-help by promoting 
cybersecurity expertise. Despite an increasing need, few individuals qualify as 
cybersecurity experts, forcing the public to rely on the advice of a small community of IT 
 
information about vulnerabilities and programs that exploit vulnerabilities has enlarged the population of 
computer users capable of successfully breaching computer security.” Preston & Lofton, supra note 88, at 
78. However, this goes hand-in-hand with the increased population of users capable of successfully 
improving computer security and resolving the issues. 
161 See Evans & Hintz, supra note 23. 
162 See id. When Google established Project Zero in 2014, it revised this policy to a 90-day deadline. See 
Chris Evans, Announcing Project Zero, GOOGLE PROJECT ZERO BLOG (July 15, 2014, 5:30 AM), 
http://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2014/07/announcing-project-zero.html.  
163 See id. Many companies have adopted similar, though not as stringent, policies to compel resolution 
of data vulnerabilities. See, e.g., Disclosure Policy, SECUNIA, 
http://secunia.com/community/research/policy/ (last visited Aug. 3, 2014); ICS-CERT Vulnerability 
Disclosure Policy, ICS-CERT, http://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/ICS-CERT-Vulnerability-Disclosure-Policy (last 
visited Aug. 3, 2014); Vulnerability Disclosure Program, SOLUTIONARY, 
http://www.solutionary.com/research/vulnerability-disclosure-program/ (last visited Aug. 3, 2014). 
164 See Information, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/whitehat (last visited Aug. 3, 2014) 
(defining a policy offering bounties for responsibly reporting bugs); Increased Rewards for Google’s Web 
Vulnerability Reward Program, GOOGLE ONLINE SECURITY BLOG, http://googleonlinesecurity. 
blogspot.com/2013/06/increased-rewards-for-googles-web.html (last visited Aug. 3, 2014) (outlining a 
program to reward researchers who submit vulnerability reports regarding Google’s services); Zero Day 
Initiative, TIPPINGPOINT, http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/about/ (last visited Aug. 3, 2014) (detailing an 
initiative to pay researchers to report security bugs to independent firms). 
165 Zero Day Initiative, TIPPINGPOINT, supra note 164. 
166 “Computer owners and operators who are aware of a potential vulnerability can take steps to fix it, 
while they are powerless to fix an unknown vulnerability.” Preston & Lofton, supra note 88, at 81. 
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professionals.167 These experts thus stand at the vanguard of data security accountability, 
helping the public determine who to trust in the cyber marketplace. Without this 
guidance, consumers would be unable to make informed decisions when divulging 
personal information to potential data-holders. In turn, companies without proper data 
security measures in place would remain unconstrained by market forces. Worse yet, 
determining the extent of one’s online exposure is difficult, causing many consumers to 
traverse the Internet without knowing where and with whom their personal data is 
stored.168 The opacity of data-holders’ identities would further increase without 
accountability, magnifying the current risk of harm from a breach. Given these points, 
cybersecurity experts decrease both individual and systemic risk by empowering the 
public to act as prudent decision-makers.   
¶64  Vulnerability disclosures provide crucial information for security experts to solve 
these issues before they arise. Jennifer Granick, Director of Civil Liberties at the Stanford 
Center for Internet and Society, emphasizes that restrictions on vulnerability publications 
would discourage the development of computer-security technologies because innovation 
requires open access, peer review, and experimental replication.169 Publications of data 
vulnerabilities permit the data security community to collaborate and collectively address 
misrepresentations or weaknesses, acting as “‘fact-checkers’ of the information 
technology ecosystem.”170 This ultimately strengthens security systems and increases the 
availability of the most advanced security technologies.171 Thus, concealing data 
weakness discoveries potentially inflicts harm not only upon those affected by a specific 
 
167 See Eric Beidel & Stew Magnuson, Government, Military Face Severe Shortage of Cybersecurity 
Experts, NAT’L DEFENSE MAG. (Aug. 2011), 
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2011/August/Pages/Government,MilitaryFaceSevereShor
tageOfCybersecurityExperts.aspx (describing the high demand for cybersecurity experts in government 
work); Carric Dooley, Recruit, Reward & Retain Cybersecurity Experts, MCAFEE (Jan. 20, 2015), 
https://blogs.mcafee.com/executive-perspectives/recruit-reward-retain-cybersecurity-experts (describing 
the cybersecurity expert shortage and how to recruit these experts); see also Ali Qamar, How to Become a 
Cyber Security Expert, INFOSEC INST. (Dec. 24, 2014), http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/become-cyber-
security-expert/ (providing advice for becoming an expert in cybersecurity, recognizing that “strenuous 
work is expected”). 
168 See Preston & Lofton, supra note 88, at 138–39. 
169 See Jennifer Stisa Granick, The Price of Restricting Vulnerability Publications, 9 INT’L J. COMM. L. 
& POL’Y 1 (2005). Famed commentator Eugene Volokh further notes:  
 
Discussions of computer security problems, or of encryption or decryption algorithms, 
can educate computer programmers who are working in the field or who are studying the 
subjects . . . create new algorithms and security systems. Scientific research is generally 
thought to advance more quickly when scientists and engineers are free to broadly 
discuss their work. 
 
Volokh, supra note 151, at 1112. 
170 Matwyshyn, Hacking Speech, supra note 23, at 821. Matwyshyn also highlights that “our future as a 
viable country may literally depend on the security improvements vulnerability speech may trigger.” Id. at 
817. 
171 See id. at 817–22 (“When information security researchers expose flaws in code, their vulnerability 
speech highlights ways that systems can be attacked by malefactors. But in doing so they trigger critical 
debate around information security, and ideally, the vulnerable systems become strengthened as a result of 
the speech.”); Preston & Lofton, supra note 88, at 81 (“Computer security publications provide long-term 
benefits as vulnerabilities are corrected and better products reach the market. Computer owners and 
operators who are aware of a potential vulnerability can take steps to fix it, while they are powerless to fix 
an unknown vulnerability.”). 
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security breach, but also upon all those who suffer from otherwise preventable breaches 
had security experts been given the opportunity to learn from the prior breach. Any 
legislative or judicial action inhibiting disclosure would consequently stunt the 
development of innovative protective technologies. In the end, the paternalism inherent to 
a responsible disclosure policy restricts freedom of choice, limits competition, thwarts 
innovation, and inhibits public discourse. 
C. Heartbleed Bug: A Case Study 
¶65  The recent discovery of a major vulnerability in OpenSSL highlights the 
importance of vulnerability speech.172 In early 2014, a Google researcher and 
Codenomicon, a security firm, discovered what became known as the “Heartbleed 
bug.”173 Codenomicon issued a release describing the threat: 
The Heartbleed bug allows anyone on the Internet to read the memory of 
the systems protected by the vulnerable versions of the OpenSSL 
software. This compromises the secret keys used to identify the service 
providers and to encrypt the traffic, the names and passwords of the users 
and the actual content. This allows attackers to eavesdrop on 
communications, steal data directly from the services and users and to 
impersonate services and users.174 
Although parties originally planned to disclose the bug in a week’s time, security 
researchers decided to alert the public after recognizing the magnitude of the threat.175 In 
the aftermath, and despite it affecting two-thirds of all Internet websites, public disclosure 
provided clear benefits, expediting vulnerability resolution, increasing data-holder 
accountability, and mitigating public harm. 
¶66  After disclosure, websites raced to resolve any data vulnerabilities. While many 
succeeded admirably, for those that struggled to rectify the threat, reputational damages 
ensued.176 The availability of test-sites and browser extensions, which expose unsecure 
websites, placed additional pressure on data-holders to repair any weaknesses quickly and 
 
172 OpenSSL is an open-source implementation of Secure Socket Layer (SSL), a cryptographic protocol 
that ensures that data passed between a web server and a browser is secure and private. For a more detailed, 
yet accessible, explanation of OpenSSL, see Jakub Kasztalski, OpenSSL: What Is It and Why Is It Needed, 
GUARDIAN LIBERTY VOICE (June 8, 2014), http://guardianlv.com/2014/06/openssl-what-is-it-and-why-is-it-
needed/. 
173 Lily Hay Newman, Popular Encryption Software’s “Heartbleed” Bug Leaks Information, SLATE 
(Apr. 8, 2014, 4:09 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2014/04/08/heartbleed_openssl_encryption_bug_discovered_by_c
odenomicon_and_neel_mehta.html. Google and Codenomicon discovered the Heartbleed bug 
independently of one another, but at roughly the same time. Id. 
174 The Heartbleed Bug, CODENOMICON, http://heartbleed.com/ (last accessed Feb. 24, 2015). 
175 For a complete timeline of the discovery and disclosure of the Heartbleed Bug, see Ben Grubb, 
Heartbleed Disclosure Timeline: Who Knew What and When, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Apr. 15, 2014), 
http://www.smh.com.au/it-pro/security-it/heartbleed-disclosure-timeline-who-knew-what-and-when-
20140415-zqurk.html. 
176 See Rachael King & Steven Norton, Google, Microsoft Race to Assess Heartbleed Vulnerability, 
WALL ST. J. (Apr. 8, 2014, 6:31 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2014/04/08/google-microsoft-race-to-assess-
heartbleed-vulnerability/. It should be noted that some companies were given advance notice and the 
opportunity to patch their sites before the news was disclosed. See Grubb, supra note 175. 
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completely.177 In effect, these test-sites allowed consumers to determine which websites 
to avoid, thus reducing consumer traffic for websites unable to ensure data security.178  
¶67  But perhaps most striking was the media’s role. While the vast majority of 
vulnerable websites refrained from notifying users of potential harm,179 the media made 
up for this failure, providing information—often in easy-to-understand charts and 
diagrams—about vulnerable sites and which passwords to change.180 According to one 
study by the Pew Research Center, this press coverage reached 64% of Internet users, 
prompting approximately two-thirds of these users—or 39% of all Internet users—to take 
protective measures, such as by changing their passwords.181 Timely disclosure thus 
enabled the public to engage in self-help, avoiding a data security calamity of 
unimaginable proportions. What damage would have occurred without prompt public 
disclosure is unknown. What we do know, however, is that if the media had not played 
such an integral role in notifying the public, many of these mitigating efforts would not 
have occurred.   
VI. OTHER LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS 
¶68  The vulnerability-speech debate does not occur in a legal vacuum. Other than First 
Amendment jurisprudence, commentators identify various fields of law beyond the 
intended scope of this Article, such as intellectual property law and privacy law, which 
may affect vulnerability-speech interests in certain situations.182 Contract and agency law, 
however, are pertinent to this Article’s analysis.  
¶69  The unique relationship between cybersecurity experts and data-holders potentially 
limits First Amendment rights. Conscientious data-holders engage cybersecurity experts 
to mitigate the threat of a data breach. Because this likely requires access to proprietary 
information, contracts detailing these arrangements are understandably replete with 
nondisclosure obligations. Coupled with the ability to access highly sensitive 
 
177  See, e.g., Chromebleed, CHROME WEB STORE, 
https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/chromebleed/eeoekjnjgppnaegdjbcafdggilajhpic (last visited 
Aug. 29, 2014); LastPass Heartbleed Checker, LASTPASS, https://lastpass.com/heartbleed/ (last visited 
Aug. 29, 2014). 
178 See Brian Krebs, Heartbleed Bug: What Can You Do?, KREBS ON SECURITY (Apr. 14, 2014), 
http://krebsonsecurity.com/2014/04/heartbleed-bug-what-can-you-do/. 
179 Some notable exceptions include Amazon Web Services, LastPass, Pinterest, Prezi, SoundCloud, 
Tumblr, Turbotax, and Wikipedia, all of which publicly announced the data vulnerabilities resulting from 
the Heartbleed Bug. 
180 See, e.g., Jason Cipriani, Heartbleed Bug: Check Which Sites Have Been Patched, CNET (Apr. 9, 
2014, 2:54 PM), http://www.cnet.com/how-to/which-sites-have-patched-the-heartbleed-bug/; The 
Heartbleed Hit List: The Passwords You Need to Change Right Now, MASHABLE (Apr. 9, 2014, 11:00 
AM), http://mashable.com/2014/04/09/heartbleed-bug-websites-affected/; Molly Wood, Flaw Calls for 
Altering Passwords, Experts Say, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/10/technology/flaw-calls-for-altering-passwords-experts-say.html. 
181 Lee Rainie & Maeve Duggan, Heartbleed’s Impact, PEW RESEARCH INTERNET PROJECT (Apr. 30, 
2014), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/04/30/heartbleeds-impact/. 
182 This Article will not address these ancillary legal implications, but it is important to note that various 
legal principles might be relevant to further analysis. For additional reading, consider:  Susan W. Brenner, 
Complicit Publication: When Should the Dissemination of Ideas and Data Be Criminalized?, 13 ALB. L.J. 
SCI. & TECH. 273 (2003); Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in 
Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147 (1998); Pamela Samuelson, Principles for Resolving 
Conflicts Between Trade Secrets and the First Amendment, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 777 (2007).  
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information, a cybersecurity expert’s specialized know-how creates the potential for 
abuse. Whether through faulty advice or the exploitation of confidential information, a 
security researcher can cause widespread harm, affecting both the data-holder and all 
those who trusted the data-holder with protecting their personal information. As a result, 
special duties may extend beyond those defined via contract. Determining the existence 
and scope of special duties stemming from a trust-based relationship requires fact-
specific analysis.  
¶70  Government employees with knowledge of sensitive information, for instance, 
might incur heightened obligations limiting free speech. In Snepp v. United States, the 
CIA sued a former agent after he published a book about the CIA’s involvement in South 
Vietnam based on his experience as an agent.183 Snepp had signed a contract agreeing 
“not [to] publish . . . any information or material relating to the Agency, its activities or 
intelligence activities generally, either during or after the term of [his] employment . . . 
without specific prior approval by the Agency.”184 Essentially, the contract required prior 
clearance to disclose any information related to the CIA—whether fact or opinion, and 
regardless of its confidentiality.185 Thus, even though the parties stipulated that Snepp 
had not disclosed any classified information, Snepp had nevertheless breached his 
employment contract when he chose not to submit his book for prior approval.186 The 
more nebulous question was if this breach warranted imposing a constructive trust.187  
¶71  The Court held that the contract was valid, including its prepublication review 
process, and that a constructive trust was proper, requiring Snepp to assign all profits 
resulting from the sale of the book to the CIA.188 The Court recognized:  
Snepp’s employment with the CIA involved an extremely high degree of 
trust. In the opening sentence of the agreement that he signed, Snepp 
explicitly recognized that he was entering a trust relationship. The trust 
agreement specifically imposed the obligation not to publish any 
information relating to the Agency without submitting the information for 
clearance. . . . He deliberately and surreptitiously violated his obligation to 
submit all material for prepublication review. Thus, he exposed the 
classified information with which he had been entrusted to the risk of 
disclosure.189   
The Court emphasized Snepp’s fiduciary duties and contractual obligations to the CIA.190 
But as Justice Stevens noted in dissent, a constructive trust is typically a remedy for 
unjust enrichment resulting from the breach of a fiduciary duty.191 If Snepp had disclosed 
and profited from classified information, then he would have violated his duty of loyalty 
 
183 444 U.S. 507 (1980). 
184 Id. at 513. 
185 Id. at 508. 
186 Id. at 513. 
187 Id. at 511. 
 188 Id. at 510–12, 515. 
189 Id. at 510–11. 
190 Id. at 510–12, 515.  
191 Id. at 519 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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to the CIA, which would have warranted imposing a constructive trust.192 However, 
Snepp had not disclosed classified information, instead breaching the terms of his 
employment contract requiring prepublication approval.193 Unlike a simple breach of 
contract, which would have resulted in, at worst, punitive damages, the Court interpreted 
Snepp’s obligation to submit publications for prior approval as a fiduciary duty.194 In 
sum, Snepp’s obligations extended beyond those defined in his employment contract 
because a trust-based relationship imposed special duties. 
¶72  Even outside the government-employment context, security researchers may find 
themselves similarly bound by both an employment contract and a fiduciary-like 
relationship. Analogous to the relationship between the CIA and its former agent, a 
security researcher employed by or under contract with a data-holder might face 
comparable legal backlash upon public disclosure of a data vulnerability. Contractually, 
this arrangement could take the form of a responsible-disclosure notification policy or a 
nondisclosure agreement, either restricting the individual’s right to disclose news about 
the vulnerability—with prepublication notice or other means functioning like 
prepublication review—or imposing contractual remedies following publication of a 
breach.195  
¶73  Moreover, contractual duties may prevent parties who are otherwise unaffiliated 
with the data-holder from publishing news of a data vulnerability. For instance, creating 
an account on a data-holder’s website—a potentially necessary step in the discovery of a 
vulnerability—may impose certain duties restricting vulnerability speech, such as those 
found in a Terms of Service agreement.196 Additionally, in the software context, an end-
user license agreement (EULA) may include a “no reverse engineering” clause or similar 
limitations that affect the user’s right to release data about the software’s performance.197 




194 See id. 
195 For example, NDAs frequently appear in the testing industry. When e-voting systems were rising to 
prominence, the computer consultants who contracted to test the security of the voting software were 
expected to sign NDAs. This troubled voting activists, who were then unable to obtain information to judge 
the impartiality, fairness, or completeness of the testing process. Kim Zetter, E-Voting Tests Get Failing 
Grade, WIRED (Nov. 1, 2004), http://archive.wired.com/politics/security/news/2004/11/65535?current 
Page=all. NDAs may also be relevant outside of the employment context. For example, if Android 
discovers or is notified of a dangerous security vulnerability, its security team’s first step is to notify 
companies who have signed NDAs—those who are restricted from publishing information about the 
vulnerability until there has been a fix. Android will not publish until a patch has been provided to these 
companies. It requires NDAs “to ensure that the security issue does not become public prior to availability 
of a fix and put users at risk.” Security Updates and Resources, ANDROID, 
https://source.android.com/devices/tech/security/overview/updates-resources.html (last visited Mar. 3, 
2015). 
196 See Coders’ Rights Project Vulnerability Reporting FAQ, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff. 
org/issues/coders/vulnerability-reporting-faq (last visited Mar. 3, 2015) (“Websites or other internet 
services also may [have] TOS or TOU that purport to restrict otherwise legal research activities.”). This 
becomes particularly troublesome when a researcher can only gain access to the site to discover a 
vulnerability by setting up an account. 
197 See id.; see, e.g., ADOBE, ADOBE ACCESS END USER LICENSE AGREEMENT, available at 
http://www.adobe.com/content/dam/Adobe/en/products/adobe-access/pdfs/adobe-access-trial-eula-en-
06252012-2108.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2015); Alt-N Software End User License Agreement, ALT-N, 
http://www.altn.com/Company/Policies/Software-EULA/#Confidentiality (last visited Mar. 3, 2015) 
(including a “Confidentiality and No Reverse Engineering” clause).  
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from blanket prohibitions forbidding disclosure to specific parameters detailing the 
content of a disclosure should a discovery occur. 
¶74  Beyond contractual obligations, the nature of the relationship between a data-holder 
and security researcher can cause principal–agent duties to arise. In Snepp, although the 
Court looked to the employment contract to justify finding in favor of the CIA, fiduciary 
duties can nevertheless arise in the absence of a contract should a similar trust-based 
relationship exist between parties.198 While the question of whether security researchers 
are subject to these heightened duties likely requires fact-specific, case-by-case analysis, 
both the highly technical level of expertise required and the sensitivity of the information 
involved increase the likelihood of a court finding the existence of a fiduciary 
relationship.199 If a principal–agent relationship exists, the corresponding duties of care 
and loyalty might preclude security researchers from publically disclosing data 
vulnerabilities, even in egregious circumstances, because disclosure would not be in the 
best interests of the company. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Freedom of discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function in this nation, 
must embrace all issues about which information is needed or appropriate 
to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of their 
period.200 
¶75  With the rapid development and expansion of technology and the Internet, data 
security is one of today’s exigencies, the importance of which is unlikely to wane. Data 
security breaches are not an anomaly, neither in their frequency nor in scope.201 For 
instance, in the fall of 2014, a data breach involving Home Depot surpassed the 
magnitude of the Target breach, with fifty-six-million credit-card numbers stolen over a 
period of five months.202 Target and Home Depot are not alone. In just one month, among 
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199 See Jones v. United States, 703 F.2d 246, 251 (7th Cir. 1983) (extending liability when a defendant 
accepted “a discrete task, . . . [involving] special knowledge or expertise”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 43 (Tentative Draft 2005) (equating a breach of fiduciary duty 
with a breach of a “duty imposed by a relation of trust or confidence”); see id. cmt. f (“[T]he confidential 
character of a relationship normally described as ‘fiduciary’ . . . will be presumed, while the confidential 
character of a relation outside the standard fiduciary models must be proved as a matter of fact in a 
particular case.”).  
200 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940). 
201 For a complete record of the 4,489 data breaches made public since 2005, see Chronology of Data 
Breaches Security Breaches 2005–Present, PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE, 
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Rosenblum, Home Depot Data Breach: Banks’ Response Is Critical to Consumer Reaction, FORBES (Sept. 
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others, J.P. Morgan, Apple, Kmart, Dairy Queen, MBIA, and Snapchat suffered 
significant data breaches.203 Moreover, data security breaches increasingly catch the 
public’s attention, evidenced in the recent attack on Sony, which prevented, albeit 
partially, the cinematic release of The Interview.204  
¶76  In the end, collaboration and communication are essential to resolving these issues. 
As Target’s Chief Financial Officer recognized, “[O]ne of the keys going forward is 
sharing information across the industry, so we can all understand revolving threats and 
respond to them.”205 A robust debate focusing on data security needs to take place among 
the public and experts alike.206 Relevant information needs to be open and accessible to 
achieve this goal.  
¶77  Through either legislation or judicial mandate, a responsible disclosure policy 
would amount to a prior restraint, which the narrow national-security exception fails to 
justify. Importantly, rejecting a responsible disclosure policy as a prior restraint would 
not preclude criminalizing unauthorized access or otherwise regulating the dissemination 
and exploitation of personal or financial information. Further, the absence of a 
responsible disclosure policy does not affect post-publication liability (e.g., defamation, 
publication of private facts, copyright infringement, etc.) under federal or state law. As 
discussed in this Article, the vulnerability disclosure debate must take into account not 
only constitutionally protected rights under the First Amendment, but also the practical 
consequences of chilling the dissemination of vitally beneficial information. In an effort 
to avoid both limiting the development of enhanced data security safeguards and 
restricting the public’s ability to engage in self-help, Congress and the judiciary should 
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